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01-1107 Virginia v. Black
Ruling Below: (Black v. Commonwealth of VA, Va. Sup.Ct., 262 Va. 764, 553 S.E.2d 738,
2001 Va. Lexis 144)
The selectivity of Virginia's cross-burning law (Code 5 18.2-423) is facially unconstitutional
because it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of its content. The statute
is also overbroad in that it allows arrest and prosecution for otherwise protected speech
based on a statutory inference.
Question Presented: Is the Virginia statute that bans cross-burning "with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of persons" overbroad and in violation of the 1st
Amendment, even though the statute reaches all such intimidation and is not limited to any
racial, religious, or other content-focused category?
Barry Elton BLACK, et al, Appellants
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Appellee
Supreme Court of Virginia
Decided November 2, 2001
LEMONS, Justice:
In these appeals, we consider whether
Code 5 18.2-423, which prohibits the
burning of a cross with the intent of
intimidating any person or group of
persons, impermissibly infringes upon
constitutionally protected speech. The
case of Black v. Commonwealth involves
a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property
with the permission of the owner, where a
cross was burned as a part of the
ceremony. The companion cases of
O'Mara v. Commonwealth and Elliott v.
Commonwealth involve the attempted
burning of a cross in the backyard of the
home of James S. Jubilee ("Jubilee"), an
African-American, without permission.
We conclude that, despite the laudable
intentions of the General Assembly to
combat bigotry and racism, the selectivity
of its statutory proscription is facially
unconstitutional because it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely on the
basis of its content, and the statute is
overbroad.
FAGS AND PROCEEDINGS
BELOW
The prosecutions of Richard J. Elliott
("Elliott") and Jonathan O'Mara
("O'Mara") arose from a single incident in
the City of Virginia Beach. On May 2,
1998, Elliott and OMara attended a party
at the home of David Targee ("Targee").
Elliott told several people at the party that
his neighbor, Jubilee, had complained
about the discharge of firearms in Elliott's
backyard. In response, Elliott suggested
they burn a cross in Jubilee's yard.
Elliott, OMara, and Targee hastily
constructed a crude wooden cross in
Targee's garage. While transporting the
cross to the Jubilee home, Elliott referred
to Jubilee with a racial epithet confirming
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Jubilee's race. Upon arriving at Jubilee's
home, O'Mara put the cross in the ground
and attempted to light it.
In addition to the epithet, the record is
replete with references to Jubilee's race. In
the Commonwealth's motion for joinder
of defendants in the Elliott and O'Mara
cases, it is stated: "Mr. James Jubilee is an
African-American." A fire investigator
with the City of Virginia Beach testified
that Targee knew the Jubilees were black
before he participated in the cross
burning. Throughout the O'Mara and
Elliott prosecution, the Commonwealth
referred to "burning a cross in a black
family's yard." The questions of counsel
and argument to the court are replete with
references to race and racism.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, O'Mara
pled guilty to attempted cross burning and
conspiracy to commit cross burning, and
was sentenced to 90 days in jail and a $
2500 fine on each charge, with part of the
time and fines suspended. Under the plea
agreement, OMara retained the right to
appeal the constitutionality of Virginia's
cross burning statute.
Elliott was also charged with attempted
cross burning and conspiracy to commit
cross burning. Upon his plea of not guilty,
a jury found him guilty of attempted cross
burning, but not guilty of conspiracy.
Elliott was sentenced to 90 days in jail and
was fined $ 2500.
OMara and Elliott appealed to the Court
of Appeals, alleging that the Virginia cross
burning statute violated the free speech
clauses of both the United States and
Virginia Constitutions. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding
that the statute "targets only expressive
conduct undertaken with the intent to
intimidate another, conduct clearly
proscribable both as fighting words and a
threat of violence." O'Mara v.
Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 525, 536,
535 S.E.2d 175, 181 (2000).
In the third case reviewed, Barry Elton
Black ("Black") organized and led a Ku
Klux Klan rally on August 22, 1998, in
Carroll County. Following speeches filled
with racial, ethnic, and religious bigotry, a
cross approximately 25 to 30 feet tall was
ignited.
Black was indicted for violating Virginia 's
cross burning statute. He moved for
dismissal of the indictment on the
grounds that the statute was
unconstitutional. The trial court denied
Black's motion and, upon conviction by a
jury, Black was sentenced to pay a fine of
$ 2500.
Black appealed his conviction, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the trial court, "for the reasons stated
in O'Mara v. Commonwealth." Black v.
Commonwealth, Rec. No. 1581-99-3,
December 19, 2000, at 1.
THE CROSS BURNING STATUTE
Code 5 18.2-423, the cross
statute, provides that:
burning
It shall be unlawful for any person or
persons, with the intent of intimidating
any person or group of persons, to burn,
or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other
public place. Any person who shall violate
any provision of this section shall be guilty
of a Class 6 felony.
Any such burning of a cross shall be
prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.
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Black' contends that the cross burning
statute is unconstitutional because it
engages in viewpoint and content
discrimination and it fails to incorporate
the standards articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 89
S. Ct. 1827 (1969), concerning incitement
to, and likelihood of, imminent lawless
action. Additionally, Black contends that
the provision of the statute pernitting an
inference of intent to intimidate from the
mere act of burning a cross, which
excuses the Commonwealth from its
proof requirement for the establishment
of a prima facie case, further aggravates
viewpoint and content discrimination and
violates the limitations prescribed in
Brandenburg.
There is little doubt that the Klan's main
objective is to establish a racist white
government in the United States. In Klan
ceremony, the cross is a symbol of white
supremacy and a tool for the intimidation
and harassment of racial minorities,
Catholics, Jews, Communists, and any
other groups hated by the Klan. The cross
is associated with the Klan not because of
religious worship, but because of the
Klan's practice of cross burning. . . . The
Klan simply has appropriated one of the
most sacred of religious symbols as a
symbol of hate.
In 1952, in direct response to Ku Klux
Klan activities in Virginia, including
incidents of cross burning, the General
Assembly enacted the predecessor statute
[Some footnotes omitted. The remaining have
been renumbered, Ed.] Because of the similar
constitutional challenges presented in these
consolidated cases, our references to Black's
contentions shall be inclusive of those mounted by
OMara and Elliott.
to the law at issue in these cases.2 The
cross burning statute was amended on
several occasions, including an
amendment expanding the sites where
cross burning may not take place, and the
addition of the inference of intent to
intimidate from the mere act of burning a
cross for the purposes of establishing a
prima facie case under the statute.
SELECIVE REGULATION OF
SPEECH BASED UPON CONTENT
It is well established that non-verbal,
symbolic expression is "speech," and is as
fully protected by the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution as more
traditional means of communication. See,
e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89
S. Ct. 733 (1969) (wearing of black arm
bands by high school students as a protest
against the war in Vietnam). However
pernicious the expression may be, "if
there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342, 109 S. Ct.
2533 (1989). Any question about the
constitutional infirmity of such selective
proscription of speech was resolved by
the United States Supreme Court in the
case of RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305, 112 S. Ct. 2538
2 Code § 18.1-365 stated in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to
place or cause to be placed on the property of
another in the Commonwealth of Virginia a
burning or a flaming cross or any manner of
exhibit in which a burning or flaming cross, real or
simulated, is a whole or a part, without first
obtaining written permission of the owner or
occupier of the premises so to do.
1952 Va. Acts ch. 483 § 2 at 777.
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(1992).
The Virginia cross burning statute is
analytically indistinguishable from the
ordinance found unconstitutional in
RAV. RA.V. involved the prosecution of
a teenager who, with several other minors,
allegedly assembled a crudely made cross
and burned the cross inside the fenced
yard of a black family. Id. at 379. The City
of St. Paul prosecuted under its Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance, which
provided:
Whoever places on public or private
property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but
not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code $ 292.02
(1990).
[Accepting the Minnesota Supreme
Court's conclusion that the ordinance was
limited to conduct that amounts to
"fighting words," the Supreme Court
nevertheless concluded that] the
ordinance was "facially unconstitutional in
that it prohibited otherwise permitted
speech solely on the basis of the subjects
the speech addresses." RAV., 505 U.S. at
381.
Noting that "the First Amendment
generally prevents government from
proscribing speech, or even expressive
conduct, because of disapproval of the
ideas expressed," the Court observed that
"content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid." 505 U.S. at 382
(citations omitted). Exceptions to the rule
include: obscenity [citations omitted] But
simply because particular categories of
speech may be regulated does not mean
that such regulation may selectively
discriminate on the basis of content
The Commonwealth argues that the
Virginia statute is neutral because " Code
§ 18.2-423 applies equally to anyone who
bums a cross for the purpose of
intimidating anyone. The
Commonwealth further dwells upon the
phrase in RAV. which states that "threats
of violence are outside the First
Amendment." 505 U.S. at 388. This
quotation is incomplete and distorts the
holding of RA.V. While a statute of
neutral application proscribing
intimidation or threats may be
permissible, a statute punishing
intimidation or threats based only upon
racial, religious, or some other selective
content-focused category of otherwise
protected speech violates the First
Amendment. Id.
R.A.V. makes it abundantly clear that,
while certain areas of speech and
expressive conduct may be subject to
proscription, regulation within these areas
must not discriminate based upon the
content of the message. In this case, the
Commonwealth seeks to proscribe
expressive conduct that is intimidating in
nature, but selectively chooses only cross
burning because of its distinctive
message. As the Court in RA.V.
succinctly stated: "the government may
not regulate use based upon hostility - or
favoritism -towards the underlying
message expressed." 505 U.S. at 386.
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The virulent symbolism of cross burning
has been discussed in so many judicial
opinions that its subject and content as
symbolic speech has been universally
acknowledged. For example, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina declared a statute
with operative language similar to ours
unconstitutional and observed: "a burning
cross historically conveys ideas capable of
eliciting powerful responses from those
engaging in the conduct and those
receiving the message." State v. Ramsey,
311 S.C. 555, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514 (S.C.
1993). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
also declared a statute with operative
language similar to ours unconstitutional
and observed:
Those who openly burn crosses do so
fully cognizant of the controversial racial
and religious messages which such acts
impart. Historically, the Ku Klux Klan
burned crosses to express hostility
towards blacks and other groups it
disfavored, and it is that idea which
contemporary cross burners aim to
perpetuate.
State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d
753, 757 (Md. 1993).
The historical context for the passage of
the Virginia cross burning statute is
uncontrovertible. In an atmosphere of
racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance, the
General Assembly acted to combat a
particular form of intimidating symbolic
speech the burning of a cross. It did not
proscribe the burning of a circle or a
square because no animating message is
contained in such an act.
Initially, the cross burning proscription
extended only to acts on property of
another without permission. In 1968, the
limitation concerning situs was removed,
and in 1975, the addition of language
establishing prima facie evidence of intent
to intimidate from the mere act of burning
a cross reaffirmed the legislative context
of the statute. During oral argument, the
Commonwealth maintained that the
portion of the statute proscribing the
burning of a cross had nothing to do with
the motivation of the actor. When asked
how the Commonwealth could justify the
inference of intimidation provided in the
last sentence of the statute, the
Commonwealth relied upon the historical
context of cross burning. The
Commonwealth cannot have it both ways.
"SECONDARY EFFECTS"
As described above, the RA.V. analysis
begins with categories of speech that may
be subject to regulation and holds that
such regulation may not selectively
discriminate on the basis of content.
However, the Court in R.AV. recognized
that some selective regulation of
constitutionally protected speech may be
permissible if it is based upon the
"secondary effects" of speech rather than
its content. See Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 89 L. Ed. 2d
29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). In Renton, the
ordinance under review proscribed the
location of an adult motion picture theater
within 1,000 feet of any residential zone,
single- or multiple-family dwelling,
church, park, or school. Because the
ordinance did not ban adult theaters
entirely, the Court held that the ordinance
is "properly analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner regulation." Id. at 46.
The analysis used by the Court focused
upon whether the regulation was directed
at the content of the protected speech or
at a legitimate area of government
concern. Determining that the dominant
motive of the ordinance was "to prevent
crime, protect the city's retail trade,
maintain property values, and generally
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'protect and preserve the quality of [the
city's] neighborhoods, commercial
districts, and the quality of urban life,' the
Court upheld the ordinance. Id. at 48. The
Court held that the regulation in Renton
was "aimed not at the content of the films
shown at 'adult motion picture theatres,'
but rather at the secondary effects of such
theaters on the surrounding community."
Id. at 47. By contrast, the legislative
history of the Virginia cross burning
statute, the meaning afforded the
expressive conduct, and the provision of
prima facia evidence of intent to
intimidate from the mere act of burning a
cross, make it abundantly clear that Code
§ 18.2-423 is aimed at regulating content,
not "secondary effects."
OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
As discussed herein, the majority opinion
in R.A.V. holds that certain categories of
speech may be regulated, but the
government may not discriminate in its
proscription within these categories on
the basis of content. The concurring
opinions in R.A.V. preferred a more
traditional analysis confined to the
question whether the ordinance suffered
from overbreadth. As Justice White noted,
St. Paul's ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad because:
Although the ordinance as construed
reaches categories of speech that are
constitutionally unprotected, it also
criminalizes a substantial amount of
expression that -- however repugnant -- is
shielded by the First Amendment.
505 U.S. at 413 (J. White, concurring).
The Commonwealth's cross burning
statute is similarly defective.
It is not simply the prospect of conviction
under the statute that renders it
overbroad. The enhanced probability of
prosecution under the statute chills the
expression of protected speech
sufficiently to render the statute
overbroad. Virginia v. American
Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93,
98 L. Ed. 2d 782, 108 S. Ct. 636 (1988).
Threat of prosecution under a criminal
statute "tends to chill the exercise of First
Amendment rights." North Carolina Right
to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 710
(4th Cir. 1999). Self-censorship, "a harm
that can be realized even without an active
prosecution," inhibits free speech.
Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v.
Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 382 (2nd Cir. 2000).
Code 5 18.2-423 provides in part that "any
such burning of a cross shall be prima
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a
person or group of persons." Assuming
that the act is done "on the property of
another, a highway or other public place,"
the act of burning a cross alone, with no
evidence of intent to intimidate, will
nonetheless suffice for arrest and
prosecution and will insulate the
Commonwealth from a motion to strike
the evidence at the end of its case-in-chief.
That the trier of fact ultimately finds the
actor not guilty of the offense is little
consolation after arrest and prosecution
for speech or expressive conduct that is
otherwise protected. Arrest for, and
prosecution of, otherwise protected
speech, with no evidence of a critical
element of the offense other than a
statutorily supplied inference, chills free
expression. Code § 18.2-423 sweeps
within its ambit for arrest and
prosecution, both protected and
unprotected speech. As such it is
overbroad.
BRANDENBURG ISSUES
In RAV., the Court acknowledged that
the narrow construction placed upon the
ordinance limited its application to
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"fighting words," a proper category of
proscription. Nonetheless, the ordinance
was declared unconstitutional because of
its selective application to only certain
expressions of fighting words. Virginia's
cross burning statute suffers from the
same infirmity. Because we hold that the
statute impermissibly proscribes otherwise
protected speech on the basis of content,
and because the statute is overbroad, it is
unnecessary to address the remaining
challenges under Brandenburg.
CONCLUSION
Under our system of government, people
have the right to use symbols to
communicate. They may patriotically wave
the flag or bum it in protest; they may
reverently worship the cross or burn it as
an expression of bigotry. Neutrally
expressed statutes prohibiting vandalism,
assault, and trespass may have vitality for
the prosecution of particularly offensive
conduct. While reasonable prohibitions
upon time, place, and manner of speech,
and statutes of neutral application may be
enforced, government may not regulate
speech based on hostility -or favoritism
towards the underlying message
expressed.
A statute selectively addressed to the
content of symbolic speech is not
permitted under the First Amendment.
Additionally, a statute that sweeps within
its ambit both protected and unprotected
speech is overbroad. Accordingly, we hold
that Code 18.2-423 violates the First
Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The convictions in each of
these appeals will be vacated and the
indictments will be dismissed.
Reversed and dismissed.
HASSELL, Justice, with whom Carrico,
Chief Justice and Koontz, Justice, join,
dissenting:
I dissent. The majority opinion invalidates
a statute that for almost 50 years has
protected our citizens from being placed
in fear of bodily harm by the burning of a
cross...
I stand second to none in my devotion to
the First Amendment's mandate that most
forms of speech are protected,
irrespective of how repugnant and
offensive the message uttered or conveyed
may be to others. However, contrary to
the view adopted by the majority in these
appeals, the First Amendment does not
permit a person to bum a cross in a
manner that intentionally places another
person in fear of bodily harm.
[Statement of facts omitted.]
[II.] B.
We have held, since the birth of this
Commonwealth, that "the judiciary may
and ought to adjudge a law
unconstitutional and void, if it be plainly
repugnant to the letter of the
Constitution, or the fundamental
principles thereof." Kamper v. Hawkins, 3
Va. 20, 40 (1 Va. Cas. 20) (1793).
However, clearly ingrained within our
jurisprudence is the principle that this
Court "can declare an act of the general
assembly void only when such act clearly
and plainly violates the Constitution, and
in such manner as to leave no doubt or
hesitation on our minds."
Concurring opinion omitted.
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For some inexplicable reason, the majority
ignores this fundamental principle.
[C.]
Initially, I observe that Code 5 18.2-423,
by its express terms, does not proscribe
every act of burning a cross. Rather, Code
5 18.2-423 only proscribes the act of
burning a cross when such act is
performed "with the intent of intimidating
any person or group of persons" and the
act is committed "on the property of
another, a highway or other public place."
In the context of our criminal statutes,
specifically Code S 18.2-61, we have
defined intimidation as acts which put the
victim "in fear of bodily harm. Such fear
must arise from the willful conduct of the
accused, rather than from some mere
temperamental timidity of the victim;
however, the fear of the victim need not
be so great as to result in terror, panic, or
hysteria." Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228
Va. 654, 663, 324 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985).
Thus, applying the clear and unambiguous
language in Code 5 18.2-423 in
conjunction with our established
definition of intimidation, which the
majority ignores, I conclude that Code 5
18.2-423 only proscribes conduct which
constitutes "true threats." And, I note that
the United States Supreme Court, in Watts
v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 22 L.
Ed. 2d 664, 89 S. Ct. 1399 (1969),
approved the facial constitutionality of a
federal criminal statute that prohibited
someone from threatening the life of the
President of the United States. It is well
established that true threats of violence
can be proscribed by statute without
infringing upon the First Amendment.
[Citations omitted]
However, I must continue this inquiry
regarding the constitutionality of Code 5
18.2-423 because in RAV., 505 U.S. 377,
112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305, supra,
the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment imposes certain limitations
upon the regulation of speech and
expressive conduct, including true threats.
Contrary to the majority's opinion, Code 5
18.2-423 does not suffer from the defects
contained in the ordinance at issue in
RAV. As previously stated, Code § 18.2-
423 does not prohibit every act of burning
of a cross. Rather, the statute only
prohibits the burning of a cross when
such act is performed with the intent to
intimidate. And, consistent with our
jurisprudence, the word "intimidate"
means to place one in fear of bodily harm.
Unlike the City of St. Paul's ordinance,
which targeted cross burning on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender,
Code 5 18.2-423 does not contain those
limitations. The conduct proscribed in the
Virginia statute applies to any individual
who burns a cross for any reason
provided the cross is burned with the
intent to intimidate. That point is best
illustrated in OMara and Elliott because
these defendants burned a cross because
they were angry that their neighbor had
complained about the presence of a
firearm shooting range in the Elliotts'
yard, not because of any racial animus.
Additionally, the Supreme Court pointed
out in R.PV. that a valid basis for
according differential treatment even to a
content-defined subclass of proscribable
speech is when the subclass happens to be
associated with particular secondary
effects of the speech so that the regulation
is justified without reference to the
content of the speech. The ordinance that
the Supreme Court invalidated in RA.V.
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targeted any cross burning that "one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment." 505
U.S. at 380.
By contrast, from its clear and
unambiguous language, the purpose of the
Virginia statute, Code $ 18.2-423, is not to
suppress repugnant ideas, but rather to
proscribe physical acts intended to inflict
bodily harm upon the victims of such acts.
Simply stated, the Virginia statute
proscribes acts of intimidation, but it does
not prohibit persons from expressing their
views, irrespective of how repugnant or
offensive those views may be to others.
The Virginia statute does not prohibit the
burning of a cross so long as that act is
committed without an intent to place a
person in fear of bodily harm. See also In
re Steven S., 25 Cal. App. 4th 598, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 644, 646, 647-48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (statute proscribing the act of
"burning a cross on the private property
of another for the purpose of terrorizing
the owner or occupant or in reckless
disregard of that risk" is not impermissible
content-based prohibition on speech
within, the meaning of the First
Amendment); State v. Talley, 122 Wn.2d
192, 858 P.2d 217, 220, 225-27 (Wash.
1993) (statute proscribing cross burning
that places another person in reasonable
fear of harm to his person or property
does not violate the First Amendment).
III.
Defendant Black argues that Code § 18.2-
423 "does not incorporate the
requirements that the speech at issue be
directed to the incitement of imminent
lawless action, and likely to produce such
action, and as such is unconstitutional
under the standard of Brandenburg v.
Ohio, and the Brandenburg standard was
not satisfied here." I disagree with the
defendant. The Supreme Court's decision
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 23
L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969)
simply has no application here.
In stark contrast to the Supreme Court's
decision in Brandenburg, we are not
concerned here with abstract teaching
regarding the moral propriety or even
moral necessity of violence as a means for
accomplishing political reform. Rather,
the subject of this case is Code § 18.2-423,
a statute which proscribes the burning of
a cross with the intent to intimidate,
which we have held means to place the
victim in fear of bodily harm...
* * *
V.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm
the judgments of the Court of Appeals.
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Supreme Court Takes Up Virginia Cross-Burning Case;
Justices to Decide If Practice Is Free Speech or Criminal
The Washington Post
May 29, 2002
Charles Lane
Stepping into an often emotional struggle
to define the legal line between political
symbolism and political violence, the
Supreme Court announced yesterday that
it will decide whether a Virginia law
banning cross-burning violates the
constitutional guarantee of free speech.
The Virginia Supreme Court struck down
the 50-year-old law in November, ruling
that it criminalized a particular method of
conveying a political message, contrary to
the First Amendment. That court's 4 to 3
ruling overturned the convictions of three
men stemming from two separate cross-
burnings in 1998.
But other state courts have reached
different conclusions, and the case thus
presents the justices with an opportunity
to clarify the law regarding an especially
provocative practice whose unique role in
the history of Ku Klux Klan violence
against blacks and other minorities imbues
it with elements of both physical menace
and political expression. "I am pleased
that the highest court in the land will hear
our appeal," Virginia Attorney General
Jerry W. Kilgore said in a statement
yesterday. "It is important that Virginia
have the ability to protect her citizens
from this type of intimidation. Burning a
cross to intimidate someone is nothing
short of domestic terrorism."
Kent Willis, executive director of the
Virginia affiliate of the American Civil
Liberties Union, however, called the
matter "a classic free speech case." The
Virginia affiliate has sponsored the legal
defense of the three men convicted under
the cross-burning law.
"Our argument is that the burning of a
cross is an act with a message, and
because it has a message it is protected
under the First Amendment," Willis said.
The Supreme Court last weighed in on
cross-burning in 1992, when it invalidated
a St. Paul, Minn., ordinance that
criminalized cross-burning aimed at
frightening or angering others "on the
basis of race, color, creed or gender."
The St. Paul ordinance was
"unconstitutional in that it prohibits
otherwise permitted speech solely on the
basis of the subjects the speech
addresses," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in
the opinion for the court.
But that did not settle the legal
controversy over state cross-burning bans,
which are worded differently from one
another.
Supreme courts in Maryland, New Jersey
and South Carolina struck down their
states' laws, invoking the 1992 U.S.
Supreme Court ruling. Joining them, the
Virginia Supreme Court held that the
Viginia cross-burning statute was
"analytically indistinguishable" from the
St. Paul ordinance.
But supreme courts in three other states --
Florida, Washington and California --
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have said that their states' cross-burning
laws are compatible with the 1992 U.S.
Supreme Court ruling.
Kilgore, who appealed Virginia's case to
the U.S. Supreme Court in January, argues
that his state's statute, too, can pass
muster because, unlike the St. Paul
ordinance, it bars all cross-burning "with
the intent of intimidating any person or
group of persons," and does not refer to
race or religion.
Cross-burnings, Kilgore wrote in the
state's petition to the U.S. Supreme Court,
"are historically associated not with
threatened fisticuffs or other minor forms
of assault, but . . . with threats to burn,
lynch, behead or otherwise murder
innocent victims."
Such law-and-order concerns were at the
root of the state's adoption of the law in
1952, the state's petition noted. Originally,
the law banned cross-burning on another
person's property without permission; it
was amended in 1968 to cover any public
place.
The law also said that burning a cross
must itself be considered evidence of an
intent to intimidate.
In the wake of the Virginia Supreme
Court ruling, the General Assembly
passed a new bill, signed into law by Gov.
Mark Warner (D), that criminalized the
burning of any object with the intent to
intimidate, and in a "manner having a
direct tendency to place another in
reasonable fear or apprehension of death
or bodily injury."
Willis said the Virginia ACLU has no
objection to the new law.
But Kilgore said yesterday he still wants a
Supreme Court ruling to "set the
parameters . . . We'd like to resort to the
old statute."
The case, Virginia v. Black, No. 01-1107,
began in May 1998, when Richard J.
Elliott and Jonathan OrMara burned a
cross 20 feet from the home of an African
American neighbor, James S. Jubilee,
because they were angry that Jubilee had
asked Elliott's mother about the sounds of
shooting he heard coming from Elliott's
backyard rifle range.
In 1999, Elliott and OMara were
convicted and sentenced to 90 days in jail
and fined $ 2,500 each. (Half of O'Mara's
jail sentence and $ 1,000 of the fine were
suspended.)
Their appeals were later consolidated with
the case of Barry Elton Black, a Klansman
from Pennsylvania who led a cross-
burning at a Klan rally in Carroll County
in August 1998.
That cross, which was more than 25 feet
high, was planted on private property with
the owner's permission, but was clearly
visible to nearby homeowners and to
motorists driving along a state road. Black
was convicted and fined $ 2,500.
Oral arguments are expected in the fall,
and a decision is expected byJuly 2003.
Staff writer RH. Melton contributed to
this report.
Copyright @ 2002 The Washington Post
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Klansman Guilty of Burning A Cross;
All-White Jury Upholds Va. Law; Defense to Appeal
The Washington Post
June 24, 1999
Donald P. Baker
An all-white jury today found a Ku Klux
Klan leader from Pennsylvania guilty of
violating a Virginia law against cross-
burning, despite the warning of his
African American lawyer that a conviction
would imperil the right to free speech.
Barry Elton Black, imperial wizard of the
International Keystone Knights of the
KKK, was convicted of burning a cross
with the intent of intimidating an
individual or group. It took the six-man,
six-woman jury 25 minutes to find him
guilty, after which it recommended a fine
of $ 2,500 and no jail time.
The 50-year-old defendant, whose record
included seven convictions on such
charges as burglary, larceny and prison
escape, could have been imprisoned for
five years. His lawyer, David P. Baugh, of
the Virginia chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union, made it clear to the jury
that he did not share Black's racist beliefs.
But he said the Virginia law imperils the
constitutional guarantee to espouse
unpopular causes.
"We're never going to be buddies, and he
knows that," Baugh said, motioning
toward Black, "but if I can't protect him, I
can't protect anyone else."
The lawyer added that "I'm not going to
tell you that the Klan doesn't scare me,
but I don't have a right to live a life free of
fear."
Baugh, who never shook hands with his
client throughout a series of hearings and
today's trial, said he will appeal the verdict
and earlier rulings that upheld the
constitutionality of the Virginia law, which
was enacted during the Klan's heyday in
the 1930s.
During the one-day trial before Carroll
County Circuit Court Judge Duane E.
Mink, the defense called no witnesses--not
even Black, who admitted upon his arrest
that he had organized the rally and cross-
burning here Aug. 22. The prosecution
offered three witnesses: the local sheriff,
his deputy and a white woman whose
trailer home adjoins the property on
which a 25- to 30-foot cross was burned.
Although the prosecution had asked for
jail time, William H. Hurd--special
assistant to state Attorney General Mark
L. Earley (R)--who was observing the trial,
expressed satisfaction with the outcome.
"The important thing is that the law has
been upheld as constitutional and a
violator has been convicted," he said.
Civil liberties groups have argued that the
state's cross-burning law should be struck
down. "The burning of crosses clearly is
symbolic speech, which is protected by
the Constitution," said Mark Potok, a
spokesman for the Southern Poverty Law
Center, which operates a Klanwatch from
its headquarters in Montgomery, Ala.
Potok said Black heads one of about 50
Klan organizations in the nation, with a
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membership of less than 200. Fewer than
5,000 people belong to the various Klan
organizations, according to Potok, with
Black's group having chapters in seven
states--Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Florida,
Indiana, South Carolina, Tennessee and
Washington--but none in Virginia.
Prosecutor Gregory G. Goad told the
jurors that Black "has every right to be a
member of the Klan, but nobody has a
right to intimidate others, to stretch the
freedom of speech" to that extent.
Rebecca Sechrist, the woman who
testified today, said she and her family had
moved into her trailer a week before the
August rally. She said she and her two
young children were terrified by the sight
of 25 or 30 men, women and children,
dressed in white robes with pointed white
hoods, parading around a flaming cross.
"It's terrible to see. I sat there and cried,"
Sechrist said. The Klan had gotten
permission to hold the rally on land
owned by her husband's aunt.
Sechrist said she watched the Klan
members use language over a microphone
that she declined to repeat in the
courtroom. "I don't use that word, the N-
word," she said. One speaker suggested
"using a 30-30 [rifle] to randomly shoot at
blacks," she continued.
Carroll County sheriff's sergeant Richard
C. Clark Jr., who arrested Black, said that
during the 20-minute trip from the rally
site, near the crossroads town of Cana, to
the courthouse here in Hillsville, Black
told him that "whites should stand up
against blacks and Mexicans" who are
taking the jobs of whites in the area. He
said Black also bemoaned "seeing black
and Mexican men holding hands with
white women and walking along the
sidewalks" of Cana.
During the rally, which lasted about two
hours, one black family stopped their car
long enough to ask Carroll County Sheriff
Warren Manning what was going on, and
when he told them there was a Klan rally,
they hurriedly drove off.
It was the first cross-burning in memory
in Carroll, which is near the North
Carolina border and which, according to
the 1990 census, counted 109 blacks in a
population of 26,594. In adjoining
Grayson County, about 8 percent of the
population is black, said Walter Kyle,
president of the Grayson chapter of the
NAACP.
Kyle described race relations in the area as
"fair," though he said tensions rose after a
black man was beheaded and burned alive
in Grayson two years ago. A white laborer
was sentenced to life in prison in January
for the crime.
Kyle said he was upset about the Klan
leader being defended by a black attorney,
no matter how high-minded his motives.
"I believe in free speech," said Kyle, 57,
who works in a mental health facility in
Hillsville. "But it's how you deliver free
speech. These people were talking about
taking lives."
Barry Elton Black, a Ku Klux Klan leader
from Pennsylvania, walks into Carroll
County Court House in Hllsville, Va.
Copyright © 1999 The Washington Post
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Warner Signs Bill Banning Cross-Burning Intimidation
The Virginian-Pilot
April 7, 2002
Christina Nuckols
Gov. Mark R. Warner signed legislation
Saturday intended to preserve the state's
ban on burning crosses or other objects
an effort to intimidate.
"Burning a cross is never about free
speech," Warner said. "Historically in
Virginia, these aggressive acts have clearly
been intended to intimidate. They are
reprehensible and intolerable. . . . This
legislation will further demonstrate that
there is no place for hate in Virginia." The
Virginia Supreme Court last fall struck
down the state's 1952 law banning cross
burning. On a 4-3 vote, the court said
cross burning is protected free speech.
The new law makes it illegal to burn any
object with the intent of intimidating
another person, but it does not specifically
mention crosses. The ban covers objects
burned on a yard or other private property
without permission as well as on a
highway or other public place.
A violation of the law is a Class 6 felony,
which carries a maximum prison term of
five years.
The bill sponsored by Sen. Yvonne B.
Miller, D-Norfolk, and Del. Winsome E.
Sears, R-Norfolk - attracted broad support
in the General Assembly.
"I really am impressed with the legislators
in Virginia because a lot of them saw the
Supreme Court decision as opening the
door to lawless behavior in Virginia,"
Miller said. "It was very inspiring to me
that people wanted to close that loophole
because we don't want people to be
intimidated."
Miller praised Sen. Kenneth W. Stolle, R-
Virginia Beach, chairman of the Virginia
State Crime Commission, for providing
attorneys on his staff to help her write a
law that could withstand any legal
challenges.
The issue attracted interest among South
Hampton Roads delegates, in part because
of a 1998 case in which a cross was
burned on the Virginia Beach lawn of
James and Susan Jubilee, an interracial
couple. A teen-ager was convicted in 1999
and given 90 days in jail in the case.
The state's old cross-burning law remains
on the books for now because Attorney
General Jerry W. Kilgore has asked the
U.S. Supreme Court to uphold it. Kilgore
is arguing that cross-burning laws have
been ruled constitutional in Florida,
Washington and California as well as in
two federal circuit courts.
Copyright a 2002 Landmark
Communications, Inc.
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Why It Was Right to Strike Down the Cross-Burning Law
The Virginian-Pilot
November 18, 2001
Kevin E. Martingayle
Error of opinion may be tolerated where
reason is left free to combat it.
These words were said more than 200
years ago by Thomas Jefferson as he
endured vicious personal attacks in the
election of 1800.
Kerry Dougherty's Nov. 6 column
disagreeing with the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision striking down an anti-
cross burning statute reveals a very un-
Jeffersonian view of the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and
expression. She is not alone. On Nov. 8,
The Pilot published a spate of vitriolic
letters to the editor denouncing this
decision under the headline, "Cross
burning is hate; justices should have seen
that."
Of course it's hate, and of course they saw
that. But hate is legal. The easy (and
irresponsible) thing to do is to criticize the
opinion without knowing what it says. For
those who prefer to speak from an
informed point of view, Black vs.
Commonwealth may be viewed at
www.courts.state.va.us.
The invalidated Virginia statute makes it a
felony crime for "any person or persons,
with the intent of intimidating any person
or group of persons, to burn, or cause to
be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway, or other public place."
Further, the law provides that "any such
burning of a cross shall be prima facie
(presumed) evidence of an intent to
intimidate. . . ." The law makes no
exception for "permissive" cross burnigs,
such as at a rally or demonstration, and
censors only crosses.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated
repeatedly that all "content-based" laws
are "presumptively invalid." The
government may neither favor nor
disfavor particular messages. Moral
judgments are reserved to the people.
For purposes of the First Amendment,
"speech" does not mean only words. Flag
burning, displaying symbols in support of
communism and "sit-ins" by African-
American students have all been deemed
"speech."
When a statute criminalizes "fighting
words," courts apply something known as
the Brandenburg test (from a 1969 U.S.
Supreme Court case), which requires that
the government prove that the actor or
speaker have the intent to produce
imminent lawless action under
circumstances showing that violence is
likely. Mere intimidation is not enough.
In addition to failing the Brandenburg
test, the Virginia statute also ran afoul of a
1992 U.S. Supreme Court decision
invalidating a similar statute in Minnesota.
Subsequently, such statutes were struck
down in New Jersey, Maryland and South
Carolina.
Notwithstanding, the Virginia General
Assembly took no steps to modify our
own anti-cross-burning statute. Simply by
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amending the law to protect all types and
groups of people from all forms of truly
threatening conduct, the Virginia statute
could have been fixed. The judicial system
cannot be blamed for this. Judges do not
write laws.
The court's decision does not mean that
citizens should feel free to run out and
plant crosses in their neighbors' yards, and
think that they can get away with setting
fires. There are many laws against such
behavior, such as trespassing, disturbing
the peace, disorderly conduct and
numerous fire control ordinances. The
valid laws on the books address conduct
as opposed to the message behind the
conduct.
The U.S. and Virginia supreme courts did
not want to help the defendants in their
respective cross-burning cases.
Undoubtedly, they were appalled by
bigoted behavior. However, the courts
recognized that they had an obligation to
follow the mandates of the First
Amendment. The statutes were at issue,
not the facts of the individual incidents.
Of course, one of the ironies is that in the
Virginia Beach incident, the homeowners
never saw the small cross until the next
day, and the attempt to bum the cross
failed (it went out). Had the defendants
physically attacked the homeowners, they
would have been charged with
misdemeanor assault. Because of the anti-
cross-burning statute, however, they were
charged with felonies, even though there
was no physical contact and the
homeowners never saw a burning cross.
What is worse: a physical attack or a mean
message?
The other Virginia incident involved a
non-violent rally conducted with a
property-owner's permission. Racist? Yes.
Threat of imminent violence? No.
If this particular anti-cross-burning statute
had been allowed to stand, the door
would have been flung wide open for the
creation of politically correct, "talk nice"
statutes.
Sadto say, people say mean and nasty
things. Some caucasians say awful things
about African Americans, and vice-versa.
And in the past two months, we have all
witnessed the ugly talk and
demonstrations against Afghan
Americans.
Fair- minded, reasonable Americans
disagree with sentiments expressed by
bigots and racists. But it is not for the
government to regulate what people think
or say.
A decorated Vietnam War veteran I
admire once said, "I may disagree with
what you say, but I'll fight like hell for
your right to say it."
I believe that Thomas Jefferson and the
war hero got it right, and so did the
Virginia Supreme Court.
Kevin E. Martingayle, a Virginia Beach
attorney, is counsel for Jonathan O'lara,
one of the defendants in the Virginia
Beach cross-burning case.
Copyright 0 2001 Landmark
Communications, Inc.
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Why Striking Down the Cross-Burning Law Was Wrong
The Virginian-Pilot
November 24, 2001
Scott Vachris and Afshin Farashahi
As the attorneys who prosecuted the
cross-burning case in Virginia Beach and
prepared the original response brief in the
appeal process, we would like to respond
to Kevin Martingayle's article, "Why it was
right to strike down the cross-burning
law" (Commentary, Nov. 18).
Mr. Martingayle failed to mention that
both the trial court and a unanimous
three-member panel of the Court of
Appeals ruled that that the Virginia cross-
burning statute was constitutional.
While the Supreme Court of Virginia did
rule it was unconstitutional, it was a 4-3
split. He also failed to mention that states
like Florida, California and Washington
have ruled that their respective cross
burning statutes are constitutional. In the
dissenting opinion, Justice Hassell stated,
"Without question the framers of the
Constitution never contemplated that a
court would construe that Amendment so
that it would permit a person to burn a
cross in a manner that intentionally places
citizens in fear of bodily harm."
As Justice Hassell correctly noted, the
cross-burning statute "does not prohibit
every act of burning a cross. Rather, the
statute only prohibits the burning of a
cross when such act is performed with the
intent" to intimidate.
The Minnesota
unconstitutional by
Court) targeted cross
statute (ruled
the U.S. Supreme
burning on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender,
the Virginia statute does not contain those
limitations.
The conduct proscribed in the Virginia
statute applies to any individual who
burns a cross for any reason provided the
cross is burned with the intent to
intimidate.
It is our understanding that the Virginia
Attorney General intends to appeal the
Virginia Supreme Court decision to the
U.S. Supreme Court. [... ]
While we concede that this is a
complicated issue on which reasonable
people can disagree, we also believe it is
important for the citizens who believe the
case was decided wrongly to realize that
three Virginia Supreme Court justices, at
least four other judges and many others
agree with them.
Moreover, to quote Justice Hassell again,
we "stand second to none in (our)
devotion to the First Amendment's
mandate that most forms of speech are
protected, irrespective of how repugnant
and offensive the message uttered or
conveyed may be to others."
But we do not believe that the First
Amendment protects conduct that
intentionally places another person in fear
of bodily harm. We are confident that
Thomas Jefferson and the war hero cited
in Mr. Martingayle's letter would agree.
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American Library Ass'n v. United States
Ruling Below: (American Library Association, Inc. v. U.S.; Multnomah County Public
Libraryv. U.S., E.D. Pa., 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9537)
The court held that Children's Internet Protection Act is overbroad because the filtering
programs required by the law block access to constitutionally protected speech and less
restrictive methods of protecting children from unprotected speech are available.
Question Presented: Whether the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which
conditions the receipt of federal funding on the employment of internet filtering programs,
violates the First Amendment of the Constitution.
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs:
V.
UNITED STATES, et al. Defendants
MULTNOMAH COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY, et al., Plaintiffs:
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants
United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Decided May 31, 2002
[Due to the length of this opinion (195
pages), only the preliminary statement and
conclusion are reprinted. Ed.]
BECKER, District Judge
1. Preliminary Statement
This case challenges an act of Congress
that makes the use of filtering software by
public libraries a condition of the receipt
of federal funding. The Internet, as is well
known, is a vast, interactive medium
based on a decentralized network of
computers around the world. Its most
familiar feature is the World Wide Web
(the "Web"), a network of computers
known as servers that provide content to
users. The Internet provides easy access to
anyone who wishes to provide or
distribute information to a worldwide
audience; it is used by more than 143
million Americans. Indeed, much of the
world's knowledge accumulated over
centuries is available to Internet users
almost instantly. Approximately 10% of
the Americans who use the Internet
access it at public libraries. And
approximately 95% of all public libraries
in the United States provide public access
to the Internet.
While the beneficial effect of the Internet
i expanding the amount of information
available to its users is self-evident, its low
entry barriers have also led to a perverse
result facilitation of the widespread
dissemination of hardcore pornography
within the easy reach not only of adults
who have every right to access it (so long
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as it is not legally obscene or child
pornography), but also of children and
adolescents to whom it may be quite
harmful. The volume of pornography on
the Internet is huge, and the record before
us demonstrates that public library
patrons of all ages, many from ages 11 to
15, have regularly sought to access it in
public library settings. There are more
than 100,000 pornographic Web sites that
can be accessed for free and without
providing any registration information,
and tens of thousands of Web sites
contain child pornography.
Libraries have reacted to this situation by
utilizing a number of means designed to
insure that patrons avoid illegal (and
unwanted) content while also enabling
patrons to find the content they desire.
Some libraries have trained patrons in
how to use the Internet while avoiding
illegal content, or have directed their
patrons to "preferred" Web sites that
librarians have reviewed. Other libraries
have utilized such devices as recessing the
computer monitors, installing privacy
screens, and monitoring implemented by a
"tap on the shoulder" of patrons
perceived to be offending library policy.
Still others, viewing the foregoing
approaches as inadequate or
uncomfortable (some librarians do not
wish to confront patrons), have purchased
commercially available software that
blocks certain categories of material
deemed by the library board as unsuitable
for use in their facilities. Indeed, 7% of
American public libraries use blocking
software for adults. Although such
programs are somewhat effective in
blocking large quantities of pornography,
they are blunt instruments that not only
"underblock," i.e., fail to block access to
substantial amounts of content that the
library boards wish to exclude, but also,
central to this litigation, "overblock," i.e.,
block access to large quantities of material
that library boards do not wish to exclude
and that is constitutionally protected.
Most of the libraries that use filtering
software seek to block sexually explicit
speech. While most libraries include in
their physical collection copies of volumes
such as The Joy of Sex and The Joy of Gay
Sex, which contain quite explicit
photographs and descriptions, filtering
software blocks large quantities of other,
comparable information about health and
sexuality that adults and teenagers seek on
the Web. One teenager testified that the
Internet access in a public library was the
only venue in which she could obtain
information important to her about her
own sexuality. Another library patron
witness described using the Internet to
research breast cancer and reconstructive
surgery for his mother who had breast
surgery. Even though some filtering
programs contain exceptions for health
and education, the exceptions do not
solve the problem of overblocking
constitutionally protected material.
Moreover, as we explain below, the
filtering software on which the parties
presented evidence in this case overblocks
not only information relating to health
and sexuality that might be mistaken for
pornography or erotica, but also vast
numbers of Web pages and sites that
could not even arguably be construed as
harmful or inappropriate for adults or
minors.
The Congress, sharing the concerns of
many library boards, enacted the
Children's Internet Protection Act
("CIPA"), Pub. L. No. 106-554, which
makes the use of filters by a public library
a condition of its receipt of two kinds of
subsidies that are important (or even
critical) to the budgets of many public
libraries grants under the Library
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Services and Technology Act, 20 U.S.C.
9101 et seq. ("LSTA"), and so-called "E-
rate discounts" for Internet access and
support under the Telecommunications
Act, 47 U.S.C. 5 254. LSTA grant funds
are awarded, inter alia, in order to: (1)
assist libraries in accessing information
through electronic networks, and (2)
provide targeted library and information
services to persons having difficulty using
a library and to underserved and rural
communities, including children from
families with incomes below the poverty
line. E-rate discounts serve the similar
purpose of extending Internet access to
schools and libraries in low-income
communities. CIPA requires that libraries,
in order to receive LSTA funds or E-rate
discounts, certify that they are using a
"technology protection measure" that
prevents patrons from accessing "visual
depictions" that are "obscene," "child
pornography," or in the case of minors,
"harmful to minors." 20 U.S.C. 5
9134(f)(1)(A) (LSTA); 47 US.C. 5
254(h)(6)(B) & (C) (E-rate).
The plaintiffs, a group of libraries, library
associations, library patrons, and Web site
publishers, brought this suit against the
United States and others alleging that
CIPA is facially unconstitutional because:
(1) it induces public libraries to violate
their patrons' First Amendment rights
contrary to the requirements of Soth
Dakota u Dde, 483 US. 203 (1987); and
(2) it requires libraries to relinquish their
First Amendment rights as a condition on
the receipt of federal funds and is
therefore impermissible under the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. In
arguing that CIPA will induce public
libraries to violate the First Amendment,
the plaintiffs contend that given the limits
of the filtering technology, CIPA's
conditions effectively require libraries to
impose content-based restrictions on their
patrons' access to constitutionally
protected speech. According to the
plaintiffs, these content-based restrictions
are subject to strict scrutiny under public
forum doctrine, see Raenl-er u Rector &
Vzsitos of Uniu of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837
(1995), and are therefore permissible only
if they are narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest and no less
restrictive alternatives would further that
interest, see Reno vA CL U, 521 U.S. 844,
874 (1997).() The government responds
that CIPA will not induce public libraries
to violate the First Amendment, since it is
possible for at least some public libraries
to constitutionally comply with CIPA's
conditions. Even if some libraries' use of
filters might violate the First Amendment,
the government submits that CIPA can be
facially invalidated only if it is impossible
for any public library to comply with its
conditions without violating the First
Amendment.
Pursuant to CIPA, a three-judge Court
was convened to try the issues. Pub. L.
No. 106-554. Following an intensive
period of discovery on an expedited
schedule to allow public libraries to know
whether they need to certify compliance
with CIPA by July 1, 2002, to receive
subsidies for the upcoming year, the
Court conducted an eight-day trial at
which we heard 20 witnesses, and received
numerous depositions, stipulations and
documents. The principal focus of the
trial was on the capacity of currently
available filtering software. The plaintiffs
adduced substantial evidence not only that
filtering programs bar access to a
substantial amount of speech on the
Internet that is clearly constitutionally
protected for adults and minors, but also
that these programs are intrinsically
unable to block only illegal Internet
content while simultaneously allowing
access to all protected speech.
152
As our extensive findings of fact reflect,
the plaintiffs demonstrated that thousands
of Web pages containing protected speech
are wrongly blocked by the four leading
filtering programs, and these pages
represent only a fraction of Web pages
wrongly blocked by the programs. The
plaintiffs' evidence explained that the
problems faced by the manufacturers and
vendors of filtering software are legion.
The Web is extremely dynamic, with an
estimated 1.5 million new pages added
every day and the contents of existing
Web pages changing very rapidly. The
category lists maintained by the blocking
programs are considered to be proprietary
information, and hence are unavailable to
customers or the general public for
review, so that public libraries that select
categories when implementing filtering
software do not really know what they are
blocking.
There are many reasons why filtering
software suffers from extensive over- and
underblocking, which we will explain
below in great detail. They center on the
limitations on filtering companies' ability
to: (1) accurately collect Web pages that
potentially fall into a blocked category
(e.g., pornography); (2) review and
categorize Web pages that they have
collected; and (3) engage in regular re-
review of Web pages that they have
previously reviewed. These failures spring
from constraints on the technology of
automated classification systems, and the
limitations inherent in human review,
including error, misjudgment, and scarce
resources, which we describe in detail inra
at 58-74. One failure of critical
importance is that the automated systems
that filtering companies use to collect
Web pages for classification are able to
search only text, not images. This is
crippling to filtering companies' ability to
collect pages containing "visual
depictions" that are obscene, child
pornography, or harmful to minors, as
CIPA requires. As will appear, we find
that it is currently impossible, given the
Internet's size, rate of growth, rate of
change, and architecture, and given the
state of the art of automated classification
systems, to develop a filter that neither
underblocks nor overblocks a substantial
amount of speech.
The government, while acknowledging
that the filtering software is imperfect,
maintains that it is nonetheless quite
effective, and that it successfully blocks
the vast majority of the Web pages that
meet filtering companies' category
definitions (e.g., pornography). The
government contends that no more is
required. In its view, so long as the
filtering software selected by the libraries
screens out the bulk of the Web pages
proscribed by CIPA, the libraries have
made a reasonable choice which suffices,
under the applicable legal principles, to
pass constitutional muster in the context
of a facial challenge. Central to the
government's position is the analogy it
advances between Internet filtering and
the initial decision of a library to
determine which materials to purchase for
its print collection. Public libraries have
finite budgets and must make choices as
to whether to purchase, for example,
books on gardening or books on golf.
Such content-based decisions, even the
plaintiffs concede, are subject to rational
basis review and not a stricter form of
First Amendment scrutiny. In the
government's view, the fact that the
Internet reverses the acquisition process
and requires the libraries to, in effect,
purchase the entire Internet, some of
which (e.g., hardcore pornography) it does
not want, should not mean that it is
chargeable with censorship when it filters
out offending material.
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The legal context in which this extensive
factual record is set is complex,
implicating a number of constitutional
doctrines, including the constitutional
limitations on Congress's spending clause
power, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, and subsidiary to these issues,
the First Amendment doctrines of prior
restraint, vagueness, and overbreadth.
There are a number of potential entry
points into the analysis, but the most
logical is the spending clause
jurisprudence in which the seminal case is
Sowb Dakata v Dde, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Dde outlines four categories of constraints
on Congress's exercise of its power under
the Spending Clause, but the only Dde
condition disputed here is the fourth and
last, i.e., whether CIPA requires libraries
that receive LSTA funds or E-rate
discounts to violate the constitutional
rights of their patrons. As will appear, the
question is not a simple one, and turns on
the level of scrutiny applicable to a public
library's content-based restrictions on
patrons' Internet access. Whether such
restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny, as
plaintiffs contend, or only rational basis
review, as the government contends,
depends on public forum doctrine.
The government argues that, in providing
Internet access, public libraries do not
create a public forum, since public
libraries may reserve the right to exclude
certain speakers from availing themselves
of the forum. Accordingly, the
government contends that public libraries'
restrictions on patrons' Internet access are
subject only to rational basis review.
Plaintiffs respond that the government's
ability to restrict speech on its own
property, as in the case of restrictions on
Internet access in public libraries, is not
unlimited, and that the more widely the
state facilitates the dissemination of
private speech in a given forum, the more
vulnerable the state's decision is to restrict
access to speech in that forum. We agree
with the plaintiffs that public libraries'
content-based restrictions on their
patrons' Internet access are subject to
strict scrutiny. In providing even filtered
Internet access, public libraries create a
public forum open to any speaker around
the world to communicate with library
patrons via the Internet on a virtually
unlimited number of topics. Where the
state provides access to a "vast democratic
foruml," Reno vA CL U, 521 U.S. 844,
868 (1997), open to any member of the
public to speak on subjects "as diverse as
human thought," id at 870 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), the
state's decision selectively to exclude from
the forum speech whose content the state
disfavors is subject to strict scrutiny, as
such exclusions risk distorting the
marketplace of ideas that the state has
facilitated. Application of strict scrutiny
finds further support in the extent to
which public libraries' provision of
Internet access umiquely promotes First
Amendment values in a manner analogous
to traditional public fora such as streets,
sidewalks, and parks, in which content-
based restrictions are always subject to
strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, a public library's use
of filtering software is permissible only if
it is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest and no
less restrictive alternative would serve that
interest. We acknowledge that use of
filtering software furthers public libraries'
legitimate interests in preventing patrons
from accessing visual depictions of
obscenity, child pornography, or in the
case of minors, material harmful to
minors. Moreover, use of filters also helps
prevent patrons from being unwillingly
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exposed to patently offensive, sexually
explicit content on the Internet.
We are sympathetic to the position of the
government, believing that it would be
desirable if there were a means to ensure
that public library patrons could share in
the informational bonanza of the Internet
while being insulated from materials that
meet CIPA's definitions, that is, visual
depictions that are obscene, child
pornography, or in the case of minors,
harmful to minors. Unfortunately this
outcome, devoutly to be wished, is not
available in this less than best of all
possible worlds. No category definition
used by the blocking programs is identical
to the legal definitions of obscenity, child
pornography, or material harmful to
minors, and, at all events, filtering
programs fail to block access to a
substantial amount of content on the
Internet that falls into the categories
defined by CIPA. As will appear, we credit
the testimony of plaintiffs' expert Dr.
Geoffrey Nunberg that the blocking
software is (at least for the foreseeable
future) incapable of effectively blocking
the majority of materials in the categories
defined by CIPA without overblocking a
substantial amount of materials.
Nunberg's analysis was supported by
extensive record evidence. As noted
above, this inability to prevent both
substantial amounts of underblocking and
overblocking stems from several sources,
including limitations on the technology
that software filtering companies use to
gather and review Web pages, limitations
on resources for human review of Web
pages, and the necessary error that results
from human review processes.
Because the filtering software mandated
by CIPA will block access to substantial
amounts of constitutionally protected
speech whose suppression serves no
legitimate government interest, we are
persuaded that a public library's use of
software filters is not narrowly tailored to
further any of these interests. Moreover,
less restrictive alternatives exist that
further the government's legitimate
interest in preventing the dissemination of
obscenity, child pornography, and material
harmful to minors, and in preventing
patrons from being unwillingly exposed to
patently offensive, sexually explicit
content. To prevent patrons from
accessing visual depictions that are
obscene and child pornography, public
libraries may enforce Internet use policies
that make clear to patrons that the
library's Internet terminals may not be
used to access illegal speech. Libraries may
then impose penalties on patrons who
violate these policies, ranging from a
warning to notification of law
enforcement, in the appropriate case. Less
restrictive alternatives to filtering that
further libraries' interest in preventing
minors from exposure to visual depictions
that are harmful to minors include
requiring parental consent to or presence
during unfiltered access, or restricting
minors' unfiltered access to terminals
within view of library staff. Finally,
optional filtering, privacy screens, recessed
monitors, and placement of unfiltered
Internet terminals outside of sight-lines
provide less restrictive alternatives for
libraries to prevent patrons from being
unwillingly exposed to sexually explicit
content on the Internet.
In an effort to avoid the potentially fatal
legal implications of the overblocking
problem, the government falls back on the
ability of the libraries, under CIPA's
disabling provisions, se CIPA 5 1712
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3)), CIPA
51721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §
254(h)(6)(D)), to unblock a site that is
patently proper yet improperly blocked.
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The evidence reflects that libraries can
and do unblock the filters when a patron
so requests. But it also reflects that
requiring library patrons to ask for a Web
site to be unblocked will deter many
patrons because they are embarrassed, or
desire to protect their privacy or remain
anonymous. Moreover, the unblocking
may take days, and may be unavailable,
especially in branch libraries, which are
often less well staffed than main libranes.
Accordingly, CIPA's disabling provisions
do not cure the constitutional deficiencies
in public libraries' use of Internet filters.
Under these circumstances we are
constrained to conclude that the library
plaintiffs must prevail in their contention
that CIPA requires them to violate the
First Amendment rights of their patrons,
and accordingly is facially invalid, even
under the standard urged on us by the
government, which would permit us to
facially invalidate CIPA only if it is
impossible for a single public library to
comply with CIPA's conditions without
violating the First Amendment. In view of
the limitations inherent in the filtering
technology mandated by CIPA, any public
library that adheres to CIPA's conditions
will necessarily restrict patrons' access to a
substantial amount of protected speech, in
violation of the First Amendment. Given
this conclusion, we need not reach
plaintiffs' arguments that CIPA effects a
prior restraint on speech and is
unconstitutionally vague. Nor do we
decide their cognate unconstitutional
conditions theory, though for reasons
explained infra at note 36, we discuss the
issues raised by that claim at some length.
For these reasons, we will enter an Order
declaring Sections 1712(a)(2) and 1721(b)
of the Children's Internet Protection Act,
codified at 20 U.S.C. 5 9134(f) and 47
U.S.C. § 254(h)(6), respectively, to be
facially invalid under the First
Amendment and permanently enjoining
the defendants from enforcing those
provisions.
Plaintiffs' argument that the federal
government may not require public
libraries who receive federal funds to
restrict the availability of constitutionally
protected Web sites solely on the basis of
the sites' content finds further support in
the role that public libraries have
traditionally served in maintaining First
Amendment values. As evidenced by the
many public libraries that have endorsed
the Freedom to Read Statement and the
Library Bill of Rights, se supra Subsection
II.D.1, public libraries seemingly have a
duty to challenge prevailing orthodoxy
and make available to the public
controversial, yet constitutionally
protected material, even if it means
drawing the ire of the community. S& Bd
of Edue- v Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that
"public libraries" are "designed for
freewheeling inquiry").
By interfering with public libraries'
discretion to make available to patrons as
wide a range of constitutionally protected
speech as possible, the federal
government is arguably distorting the
usual functioning of public libraries as
places of freewheeling inquiry. The
Velazquez Court, in invalidating the federal
government's restrictions on the ability of
federally funded legal services providers to
challenge the constitutionality of welfare
laws, relied on the manner in which the
restrictions that the federal government
placed on legal services' attorneys' speech
distorted the usual functioning of the
judicial system:
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[T]he Government seeks to use an
existing medium of expression and to
control it, in a class of cases, in ways
which distort its usual functioning. . . .
The First Amendment forb[ids] the
Government from using the forum in an
unconventional way to suppress speech
inherent in the nature of the medium.
531 U.S. at 543. By the same token, CIPA
arguably distorts the usual functioning of
public libraries both by requiring libraries
to: (1) deny patrons access to
constitutionally protected speech that
libraries would otherwise provide to
patrons; and (2) delegate decision making
to private software developers who closely
guard their selection criteria as trade
secrets and who do not purport to make
their decisions on the basis of whether the
blocked Web sites are constitutionally
protected or would add value to a public
library's collection.
At all events, CIPA clearly does not seem
to serve the purpose of limiting the extent
of government speech given the extreme
diversity of speech on the Internet. Nor
can Congress's decision to subsidize
Internet access be said to promote a
governmental message or constitute
governmental speech, even under a
generous understanding of the concept.
As the Court noted in Reno vA CL U, 521
U.S. 844 (1997), "[i]t is no exaggeration to
conclude that the content on the Internet
is as diverse as human thought." Id at 852
(internal quotation marks omitted). Even
with software filters in place, the sheer
breadth of speech available on the
Internet defeats any claim that CIPA is
intended to facilitate the dissemination of
governmental speech. Like in Velazquez,
"there is no programmatic message of the
kind recognized in Rust and which
sufficed there to allow the Government to
specify the advice deemed necessary for
its legitimate objectives." Velazquez, 531
U.S. at 548.
In sum, we think that the plaintiffs have
good arguments that they may assert an
unconstitutional conditions claim by
relying either on the public libraries' First
Amendment rights or on the rights of
their patrons. We also think that the
plaintiffs have a good argument that
CIPA's requirement that public libraries
use filtering software distorts the usual
functioning of public libraries in such a
way that it constitutes an unconstitutional
condition on the receipt of funds. We do
not decide these issues, confident that our
findings of fact on the functioning of
public libraries, their use of the Internet,
and the technological limitations of
Internet filtering software, see supra
Sections II.D-E, would allow the Supreme
Court to decide the unconstitutional
conditions claim if the Court deems it
necessary.
Having determined that CIPA violates the
First Amendment, We would usually be
required to determine whether CIPA is
severable from the remainder of the
statutes governing LSTA and E-rate
finding. Neither party however, has
advanced the argument that CIPA is not
severable from the remainder of the
Library Services and Technology Act and
Communications Act of 1934 (the two
statutes governing LSTA and E-rate
finding, respectively), and in all events, we
think that CIPA is severable.
[The court reviews factors affecting
severability and concludes that each
supports the finding that CIPA is
severable.]
For the foregoing reasons, we will enter a
final judgment declaring Sections
1712(a)(2) and 1721(b) of the Children's
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Law Limiting Internet in Libraries Challenged
The New York Times
March 25, 2002
John Schwartz
This morning in a Philadelphia
courtroom, a coalition of libraries, Web
sites and library patrons will begin nine
days of hearings in which they will ask
three federal judges to help decide a
seemingly simple question: What is a
library for?
They argue that a law passed by Congress
in December 2000 requiring schools and
libraries to use Internet filtering software
changes the nature of libraries from being
places that provide information to places
that unconstitutionally restrict it. The law
that the librarians and their allies are trying
to overturn, the Children's Internet
Protection Act, denies federal financing
and technology discounts via the federal
e-Rate program to schools and public
libraries if they do not install a
"technology protection measure" like
filters to block access to Web sites
deemed harmful to minors.
The coalition of plaintiffs includes the
American Library Association, the
American Civil Liberties Union and
Jeffrey L. Pollock, a Republican
Congressional candidate who favored
mandatory filtering until he discovered
that his own campaign's Web site was
blocked by one of the most popular
filtering programs.
They call the law a case of good intentions
leading to a bad result, hamstringing the
computers that are, for many people, the
sole link to the Internet. They argue that
the law pre-empts community control
over libraries and the judgment of local
librarians. They also point to the failings
of the software, which can let
objectionable material through and block
constitutionally protected sites. The law
constitutes "classic prior restraint on
speech," said Ann Beeson, staff lawyer for
the American Civil Liberties Union.
Those in favor of the filtering law say its
opponents mischaracterize the law and
the software. Senator John McCain,
Republican of Arizona, who co-sponsored
the bill, has said it "allows local
communities to decide what technology
they want to use, and what to filter out, so
that our children's minds aren't polluted."
Courts have, historically, given the
government high hurdles when restricting
speech, requiring strong proof that the
restrictions are necessary and evidence
that they have been designed with a
finesse that makes them the least
restrictive means of accomplishing the
goal.
The government has moved toward a
more limited approach, the Children's
Internet Protection Act being only the
latest effort by Congress to restrict the
Internet to protect children.
The first major law, the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, was struck down by
the Supreme Court as unconstitutionally
restrictive on First Amendment speech
rights, in part, the court said, because it
would reduce material that adults had a
constitutional right to see "to only what is
fit for children."
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A more narrow follow-up law, the
Children's Online Protection Act, was
challenged before the Supreme Court last
November, the decision is pending.
The new case will be heard in United
States District Court for the Third Circuit,
by a panel of three judges; under
procedures set out in the filtering law, any
appeals will go directly to the Supreme
Court.
Donna Rice Hughes, an opponent of
pornography who has supported
mandatory filtering, said the law contained
"a tremendous amount of flexibility." She
noted that the precise technology to be
used by libraries was not prescribed, and
that a library patron with a "bona fide
research or other lawful purpose" can get
the library to temporarily turn off the
filters.
Ms. Rice Hughes said the message to
libraries was simple: "You've got to do
your part -- you've got to put these filters
on or you've got to get your funding
elsewhere."
Librarians and their allies say the simple
message is complex in practice. Families
might do well with filters as part of the
close supervision of a child's Internet
wanderings at home, opponents of the bill
say, but the same technology is ill-suited
for use in libraries. Turning off the filters,
they say, is cumbersome, and having to
prove a "bona fide" research purpose
violates users' pnivacy.
"It is going to affect everyone's First
Amendment right to get access to
information that is perfectly legal," said
Judith F. Krug, director of the American
Library Association's Office for
Intellectual Freedom.
Computers, the plaintiffs argue, cannot
make the fine distinctions among online
sites that are called for in the legislation,
which defines material that is "harmful to
minors" as images that appeal to "prurient
interest in nudity, sex or excrement,"
depictions of sexual acts presented in a
"patently offensive way" and material that,
'taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value as to
minors."
Some librarians say they would not
understand how to apply such a broad
definition.
Nancy Willard, director of the Center for
Advanced Technology in Education at the
University of Oregon, said there was a
deeper issue that had been lost in the
debate over filters: blocking access to
what children see does not prepare them
for the unrestricted world that awaits
them when they turn 18. Ms. Willard
recommends training children in
responsible Internet use, and has
developed a school program for doing so.
"We need to help kids develop effective
filtering and software systems that will
reside in the hardware that sits upon their
shoulders," she said.
Copyright © 2002 The New York Times
Company
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US Court Overturns Internet Smut Law Ruling in Library Case Is 3 d Loss for Congress
The Boston Globe
June 1, 2002
Robert O'Harrow Jr.
Government efforts to restrict access to
online pornography received another
setback yesterday when a panel of federal
judges struck down a law requiring public
libraries to install Internet filters to block
access to objectionable sites.
In a unanimous decision, the three judges
of a special panel said the Children's
Internet Protection Act is "invalid under
the First Amendment" because it requires
libraries to use technology that blocks
access to legitimate sites on the World
Wide Web, while still giving access to
some sites featuring pornography.
The legislation, known as CIPA and
signed into law two years ago by President
Clinton, required that public libraries use
the electronic blocks starting July 1 or lose
millions of dollars in federal funding for
computers and Internet access.
In a 195-page decision, the judges said
"that it is currently impossible, given the
Internet's size, rate of growth, rate of
change, and architecture and given the
state of the art of automated classification
systems, to develop a filter that neither
under blocks nor over blocks a substantial
amount of speech." It was the third time
in recent years that similar laws have been
overtumed for being overbroad or
violating free speech protections.
Yesterday's decision, which applies only to
public libraries, was praised by the
American Library Association and the
American Civil Liberties Union, the
leaders of a coalition of librarians, library
patrons, and online publishers who
challenged the validity of the law last year.
"The court bans the government from
turning librarians into thought police,"
said Ann Beeson, the litigation director
for the ACLU's technology and liberty
program. "The [filters] are inherently
flawed and would prevent library patrons
all over the country from accessing
valuable sites on the Web."
A Justice Department official declined to
comment on the decision, saying that
officials there were reviewing the decision.
Any appeal would go to the Supreme
Court, which has taken a skeptical view of
congressional methods of curbing the
online pornography.
In arguing the case, no one disputed the
proliferation of smut on the Internet in
recent years. The judges estimated that
there "are more than 100,000
pomographic Web sites that can be
accessed for free and without providing
any registration information, and tens of
thousands of Web sites contain child
pornography."
They said the Internet has spurred "the
widespread dissemination of hardcore
pornography within the easy reach, not
only of adults who have every right to
access it (so long as it is not legally
obscene or child pornography), but also
of children and adolescents to whom it
may be quite harmful."
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But after two weeks of testimony in April,
the judges agreed with the group of
plaintiffs who argued that the filters are a
clumsy, inaccurate technology that violate
free-speech rights by cutting off access to
legitimate sites, such as those offering
information about sexuality, sexually
transmitted disease, and breast cancer.
While some libraries permitted patrons to
request that the filters be turned off, the
judges said such policies put the patrons
in the awkward position of seeking
permission to access sensitive material.
Officials at the American Library
Association, the lead plaintiff, said the
decision affirms the notion that parents
must protect their children by teaching
them the right ways to use the Internet.
Libraries can still choose to use filters for
computers used by young children.
Emily Sheketoff, executive director of the
American Library Association's
Washington office, estimated that at stake
in the case was up to $400 million in
annual funding distributed through the
federal E-rate program and Library
Services Technology Act grants.
"The only way to protect children is to
make sure they are educated, so they can
have a safe, responsible experience,"
Sheketoff said. "This technology is not
protecting their children."
Copyright 0 2002 Globe Newspaper
Company
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Internet Can Be a Safe Place for Kids and for Free Speech
Los Angeles Times
June 6, 2002
Amitai Etzioni
Unfortunately, when Congress set out to
protect children from the media and the
Internet, it used a sledgehammer instead
of a surgical scalpel.
The 1996 Communications Decency Act
made it a federal crime to send obscene or
indecent messages over the Internet to
anyone under the age of 18 or to post
sexually explicit material that could be
viewed by anyone under 18. The Child
Online Protection Act of 1998 made it
unlawful to post materials that are harmful
to minors on any Web site that is available
to those under the age of 17.
The first was struck down by the U.S.
Supreme Court as overly broad and in
violation of the 1st Amendment, and the
second, though partially upheld by the
high court, was sent back to a lower court
for further scrutiny and may yet be ruled
unconstitutional. Now another law has
been struck down by the 3rd Circuit Court
of Appeals. But rather than appealing this
ruling--as the Justice Department is
contemplating--recasting it could provide
the shield we need to protect children.
The idea behind the Children's Internet
Protection Act, or CIPA, is a solid one.
More than a thousand studies have shown
that the extended exposure of children to
violent and vile material in the media
makes them significantly more likely to
engage in antisocial behaviors. Moreover,
the courts have regularly recognized that
protecting children is a compelling public
interest.
In the CIPA, enacted in 2000, Congress
tried a different and a much more modest
approach than in the earlier attempts. The
law concerns only those schools and
libraries that apply for certain taxpayer-
funded programs that provide computers
and Internet access. Recipients of these
funds are only required to install filters on
all computers with Internet access.
Ostensibly, this means that the law deals
only with access and not with content.
The American Civil Liberties Union and
the American Library Assn., in
conjunction with many Internet users and
content providers, nevertheless brought
suit against CIPA on two major grounds.
First, they reintroduced content issues.
These civil libertarian groups held--and
the court agreed with them--that requiring
filters violates the 1st Amendment
because the filtering software blocks
access to many sites that contain clearly
protected speech, such as information
about sexuality and reproductive health.
Second, the plaintiffs argued that adults
should not be reduced to reading only
material that is suitable for children. This
would be, as Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter put it on another occasion,
"like burning the house to roast the pig."
However, filtering technology is getting
better. Some filters now are reported to be
more than 99% accurate. True, given the
millions of sites, filters will misclassify
some. But, as UCLA law professor
Eugene Volokh put it, if one cannot
create a perfect system in which the
speech of adults and children are
completely separate, allowing some
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restrictions that spill over into the adult
world might well be a price worth paying
if these measures protect children.
Moreover, the spillover can be minimized,
if not avoided completely, if that law is
rewritten. The Justice Department could
work with Congress to formulate a law
that would require all libraries with more
than one computer to set aside some for
children, which would be filtered, and
some for adults, which would not. If the
library has only one computer, children's
hours could be established. All adult
computers would be equipped with
privacy panels to protect others around
the viewing adults. An additional
refinement would provide different filters
for minors who are 12 or younger and for
teenagers.
One can respect the 1st Amendment and
still protect children from unbounded
exposure to material the courts recognized
as harmful.
Amita Etzioni is a professor at George
Washington, University and the author of
numerous books, including "The Limits
of Privacy" (Basic Books, 1999)
Copyright ' 2002 Los Angeles Times
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No Easy Fixes Are Seen To Curb Sex-Site Access
The New York Times
May 3, 2002
John Schwartz
One of the most thorough reports ever
produced on protecting children from
Internet pornography has concluded that
neither tougher laws nor new technology
alone can solve the problem.
"Though some might wish otherwise, no
single approach -- technical, legal,
economic or educational -- will be
sufficient," wrote the authors of the
report, "Youth, Pornography and the
Internet," issued yesterday by the National
Research Council. "Rather, an effective
framework for protecting our children
from inappropriate materials and
experiences on the Internet will require a
balanced composite of all of these
elements." What might seem a rather
bland conclusion is actually a surprising
stand, said Alan B. Davidson, associate
director of the Center for Democracy and
Technology, a technology-policy
organization in Washington.
"The report dares to be unsexy," he said.
"It does not call for legislation to solve
this problem," despite a strong push in
Congress to pass laws requiring
technology tools like pornography filters
in schools and libraries. One such law, the
Children's Internet Protection Act, is
being challenged in federal court by a
coalition of librarians and civil liberties
groups; a decision in that case is expected
this month.
Richard L. Thornburgh, the former
attorney general who led the project,
predicted in a preface to the report that its
conclusions "will disappoint those who
expect a technological 'quick fix' to the
challenge of pornography on the
Internet."
The language of the report is meticulously
balanced but wryly conclusive. Filters
intended to block pornographic sites, the
report explained, "can be highly effective
in reducing the exposure of minors to
inappropriate content if the inability to
access large amounts of appropriate
matenal is acceptable."
The report compared the problem of
protecting children from online risks to
dealing with a more mundane hazard of
daily life. "Swimming pools can be
dangerous for children," the authors
wrote. "To protect them, one can install
locks, put up fences and deploy pool
alarms. All of these measures are helpful,
but by far the most important thing that
one can do for one's children is to teach
them to swim."
Bruce A. Taylor, the president of the
National Law Center for Children and
Families, said the report would be the
basic document for judges and lawmakers
approaching these issues for the
foreseeable future, but added that he was
disappointed that the group did not make
strong recommendations on "techno-
gizmos of their own" that he said might
be developed, like age identifiers that
would follow minors through cyberspace.
Such ideas have been criticized as
impractical by Internet engineers, but Mr.
Taylor said a strong push from the
conm-mttee might have helped move
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things forward. "Parents can't create those
protocols and protections," he said, "but
how hard would it be for industry to do
it.
Herbert Lin, the director of the study, said
the process shook the preconceptions that
each participant brought to the table.
Many of them, he said, believed at the
beginning "if only people would just do
this -- whatever 'this' is -- the problem
would be all over."
"Nobody," he said, "realized how
complicated the process was."
Copyright o 2002 The New York Times
Company
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The Tricky Task of Shelving the Web
The New York Times
June 20, 2002
John Schwartz
GREENVILLE, it seemed, was plagued
with pornography. In the 12 public
libraries serving the city and its county in
South Carolina, adults were looking for
pornographic images online and didn't
care who saw them -- and, by some
accounts, were showing the images to
children passing by.
"We had parents say, 'I'll never bring my
child back to your library,' " said J. David
Sudduth, chairman of the Greenville
County library system's board. "It was a
very unhealthy environment." After other
measures proved ineffective, the board
decided to spend $2,500 a month on a
filtering service that blocks access to
millions of Web pages with adult content.
"It just took that last step for us to get the
kind of environment we want for our
library system," Mr. Sudduth said. About
150 miles away, in the DeKalb County
suburbs of Atlanta, another library system
tried a different tactic: shame. With its
computers in plain sight, it decided to
have librarians enforce clearly posted rules
against downloading pornography with a
firm tap- on-the-shoulder approach.
"Handling it the old-fashioned way, with
people, has worked best for us," said
Darro Willey, the library director. "It's just
a common-sense approach."
But in Virginia Beach, librarians decided
that privacy, not policing, was the most
practical approach. Monitors of
computers are recessed beneath the
surface of glass-topped desks, with a
plastic hood further restricting the view.
Carolyn Caywood, a branch librarian, had
concluded that urban areas like Virginia
Beach are not "villages" where shame
might work magic.
"The larger the community, the more
likely you are to get people who are
exhibitionists," upon whom
embarrassment has no effect, she said.
Each library system says its approach is
meeting its needs -- and that, librarians
say, is the most important lesson of the
pornography wars. "Because libraries are
so deeply rooted in their communities,
librarians have the best read on their
communities and how to approach the
issues around Internet access," said John
W. Berry, who stepped down this week as
president of the American Library
Association.
And for now, at least, the decisions will
continue to be made at the local level.
Three weeks ago, the latest Congressional
effort to deal with the issue, the Children's
Internet Protection Act, was blocked by a
three-judge federal appellate panel in
Philadelphia. While sympathetic to the
goals of the law, which required libraries
to install Web filters or risk losing federal
funds for Internet access, the judges
found the filters were too crude to avoid
blocking unobjectionable material that
library patrons have a right to see. The
case is expected to go to the Supreme
Court. Aside from the federal effort, a
growing number of state and local
governments have moved to require
filters, a trend that librarians have joined
forces to combat.
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"Libraries have always been about giving
people choices, not restricting them," said
Maurice J. Freedman, the new president
of the library association and director of
the Westchester County library system in
New York.
The federal filtering law and other
government attempts to limit Internet
access have failed so far because the
Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that
adults should not be limited to seeing only
what is appropriate for children if there
are less restrictive alternatives.
In the ruling striking down the filtering
law, Edward R Becker, chief judge of the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
wrote that technology could not yet clear
that constitutional hurdle in shielding
children from pornography.
"Unfortunately, this outcome, devoutly to
be wished, is not available in this less than
best of all possible worlds," he wrote.
So with the issue back where librarians say
it should be -- at the local level -- libraries
face two issues: protecting children from
stumbling onto pornography while surfing
the Web and dealing with adults who seek
out materials that are either blatantly
obscene or at least inappropriate for
children.
Libraries tread cautiously in this area.
Those that appear to do too little risk
coming under attack from anti-
pornography groups and parents. Filter
too aggressively, however, and civil
libertarians are likely to sue. When the
library board in Loudoun County in
northern Virginia instituted a tough
Internet use policy that included a filtering
requirement, civil liberties groups sued,
and in 1998 a federal judge declared the
policy unconstitutional. The library board
voted not to appeal.
In Greenville, Mr. Sudduth said, groups
had -;Aso threatened to sue the library
system if it imposed filtering, but no one
actually did so after the filters were
adopted. "We worked hard on issues of
censorship and intellectual freedom," he
said. The library system also ensured that
there was one unfiltered machine in each
library -- "kind of a relief valve," he said,
that could be used by people who had
unsuccessfully tried to reach legitimate
sites on the filtered machines and brought
the issue to librarians.
"We tried to put together a
reasonable policy that balanced the
Amendment with protecting
community," Mr. Sudduth said.
very
First
our
The emerging standard for libraries -- and
an approach recommended in a recent
report from the National Research
Council on protecting young people
online -- is to give each user a choice of
whether filters will be turned on or off at
any machine. That option is still a bit
expensive and technologically daunting
for many libraries, but more and more are
offering it.
At the regional libraries serving Fort
Vancouver, Wash., the choice of filtered
or unfiltered Internet is tied to the user's
library card number, which is entered
whenever an online session begins.
Parents can specify whether filters must
be used with their child's account or can
choose not to allow Internet access at all,
said Candace D. Morgan, the system's
associate director. She said that the system
eliminated a problem faced by patrons
when the library has one bank of
computers with filters and another
without. "You shouldn't have to declare to
the world what you're doing by what
terminal you sit down at," she said.
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But David Burt, a longtime anti-
pornography campaigner and a
spokesman for N2H2, a company whose
filtering systems are used in Greenville's
libraries and others, maintains that the
Fort Vancouver solution is only a partial
one. "It does address the biggest concern
most people have, which is to protect
their own children," he said, but "it
doesn't do anything to address people
accessing child pornography" or trying to
expose others to it.
"I hate to sound self-serving here, but I
think filtering is the best approach," Mr.
Burt said. He compared unfiltered
Internet access in libraries to "having
Hustler placed next to Highlights" on the
shelf. "From a common-sense approach,
it makes more sense to deal with the
pornography problem before it comes
into the libraries," he said.
The problem with exhibitionists, said Mr.
Willey in Georgia, is that the issue shifts
from censorship to bad behavior. And
while librarians debate whether tap-on-
the-shoulder enforcement of Internet use
policies is an invasion of the user's
privacy, they all say that bad behavior
predates the Internet by generations,
whether the problem is unwanted sexual
advances, drug abuse or consensual sex in
the stacks.
"It is one of the safest public institutions,
in my opinion, that you can find -- but it is
still a public institution," said Judith F.
Krug, the director of the library
association's Office for Intellectual
Freedom. "Sometimes bad people get in,
and sometimes they do bad things." When
that happens, libraries have a range of
responses, from asking the disruptive
person to leave to calling the police.
Ms. Krug, an opponent of the tap-on-the-
shoulder method, suggested that libraries
set their browsers to return to the home
page after a period of inactivity to prevent
the viewing of an objectionable image that
someone else has left on the screen.
Agnes Griffen, director of the Tucson-
Pima Public Library in Arizona, said that
solutions -- and public perceptions --
needed to take into account the libraries'
resources and the realities of the setting.
Anti-pornography groups have tried to
portray librarians as "people who didn't
care about little children," Ms. Griffen
said. But the truth, she said, is that
librarians recognize that they can do only
so much to protect children. "We do care
about children," she said, but added that
"the myth, the pleasant stereotype of the
children's room, which we all love, isn't
there anymore."
"We're not going to be able to sit behind
the child and watch what the child is
looking at on the screen any more than we
can follow them around while they look at
the books," Ms. Griffen said. "I'm very
sympathetic, but you can't expect the
public library to do that job for you. We're
here to help, but we can't be the monitor
or the censor or the nanny for children."
The question often comes down to an
issue of limited resources, she said. "We
can barely keep our libraries open, much
less hang over the back of a kid looking at
a PC," she said.
Ms. Griffen suggested that the battle over
Internet use in libraries arose in part from
a deeper anger over broader changes in
society. "Parents are upset because they
don't have enough time anymore to do
the parenting they wish they could do,"
she said. "They're unhappy about it and
they take it out on other people."
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Mr. Freedman of the Westchester County
libraries said that an anguished mother
had confronted him about her children's
potential exposure to pornography in the
library. There are no filters on the library
system's computer network, he said, but
one library, in Greenburgh, provides a
filter on a single machine in the children's
section.
" 'If you have cable,' I said to her, 'your
kid will be exposed to all kinds of things,'
he said. "The parent has to take
responsibility for what the kid does at
home, at other kids' homes, at the library
or on the street."
Ms. Krug of the library association said
that in a world full of risks, the library
should be a place where young people can
seek out information -- even information
about sex -- safely. "They can learn about
it in the library," she said, "or behind the
library."
AGE THRESHOLD -- Making Web
access in children's areas dependent on
the user's age -- with those below 10, for
example, being given filtered access, and
older children offered a choice of filtered
or unfiltered use.
PLAIN SIGHT -- Posting information on
filtering policies prominently so that Web
users (and parents) have a general idea of
what is being blocked.
Whether children are using the Web at the
library or at home, many experts
recommend that parents and children
agree on specific guidelines -- in essence, a
pledge -- regarding children's use of the
Web, e-mail or instant messaging. Among
the sites offering sample contracts are
www.getnetwise.com and
www.safekids.com.
Copyright 0 2002 The New York Times
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Strategies
Net Guidelines
Families
For Librarians
Decisions about restricting Internet access
for children may depend, in a particular
library, on local problems, patterns of use,
equipment and even architecture. But
librarians and others who have studied the
issue say there are some basic approaches
that may help to avoid complaints and
misunderstandings and protect privacy.
In a report last month on "Youth,
Pornography and the Internet," the
National Research Council, an arm of the
National Academy of Sciences, said that
"best practices" by libraries might include:
CLEAN SLATE -- Installing software to
clear browser histories and caches, to
prevent reference to the Web pages
consulted by previous users.
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And
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT of 2002
Campaign Reform Bill Passes Congress; Bush Says He'll Sign;
Politics: The Landmark Law Is the First Since Watergate to Seriously Curtail the
Huge Gifts of Money Being Pumped into National Politics
Los Angeles Times
March 21, 2002
Nick Anderson, with contributions by Ronald Brownstein
The Senate approved a landmark change
in federal campaign law on Wednesday,
sending President Bush a bill to check the
rising flow of huge donations into U.S.
politics.
In a statement released after the vote,
Bush said he will sign the bill, although he
considers it "flawed in some areas."
With Bush's signature, the bill would
curtail a source of funding that pumped
roughly half a billion dollars into national
politics in the last presidential campaign.
Party professionals already are retooling to
search aggressively for smaller donations
to make up for that loss--meaning
American voters can expect more
aggressive requests for their money from
politicians.
Wednesday's developments culminated a
seven-year quest by reform advocates in
Congress to put some distance between
politicians and big-money donors. The
bill's advocates say this is needed to boost
public confidence in government.
Vanquished opponents said the measure
will only weaken political parties and
trample on constitutionally protected free
speech. The Senate's 60-40 vote for the
bill followed its passage last month in the
House. The measure will produce the
biggest shake-up in political fund-raising
since the post-Watergate reforms of the
1970s.
Most significant, it would prohibit the
national political parties from raising or
spending the unlimited, loosely regulated
donations known as soft money.
These donations, a fund-raising
innovation of the late 1980s that grew
strikingly in the 1990s, often amount to
$100,000 or more. The givers are
corporations, labor unions and wealthy
individuals, many with business before
government. The money often helps the
parties promote or attack candidates in
television ads.
The bill is expected to force politicians to
rely less on this narrow band of donors
and instead cultivate a broader base of
contributions from people able to give up
to $2,000 at a time.
"We all recognized one very simple truth--
that campaign contributions from a single
source that run to the hundreds of
thousands or millions of dollars are not
healthy for democracy," said Sen. John
McCain (R-Ariz.), the bill's best-known
sponsor. "Is that not self-evident? It is to
the American people."
For the average American, the
consequence of cracking down on big
donations will be that middle- to high-
income voters should expect far more
mail or telephone calls seeking political
donations. And parties will encourage
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their wealthiest donors to ask peers to
contribute.
McCain, who first teamed with Sen.
Russell D. Feingold (D-Wis.) to push for
campaign finance reform in 1995,
generated momentum for the effort in his
2000 presidential campaign.
Now the bill's fate rests with the man who
defeated McCain that year in the GOP
primaries.
Bush, in his statement, said: "The reforms
passed today, while flawed in some areas,
still improve the current system overall,
and I will sign them into law."
He did not specify his objections to the
measure, but, echoing criticism by its foes,
he said: "It does present some legitimate
constitutional questions."
Expecting Some Provisions to Die
One reason the president plans to sign the
bill is that he anticipates some of its
provisions will be found unconstitutional,
said a Republican who has spoken to
Bush about the issue.
Bush praised parts of the measure, such as
its increase in the maximum amount of
individual contributions to candidates.
The limits on these donations have not
been raised since 1974.
But the measure differs in several ways
from the reform principles Bush detailed
as a candidate. Bush, for instance, favors
banning soft money donations by unions
and corporations, but not by individuals.
The bill also omits his proposal to require
labor unions to obtain permission from
members before spending their dues on
politics.
Wednesdays Senate debate reprised
arguments aired with more gusto and
tension last year when the Senate spent a
rollicking two weeks on the issue. Back
then, opponents fought with everything
they had. This time, they readily conceded
that they lacked the votes to amend the
bill or sustain a filibuster to block it.
Instead, the opponents concentrated on
sharpening their arguments for the legal
challenges expected to begin as soon as
the bill becomes law.
Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who
intends to become the lead plaintiff in the
case, cited in his criticism "the ultimate
campaign reform--the 1st Amendment to
the Constitution."
He said the bill would muzzle political
parties, shifting power from them to
special interests. For instance, he said the
bill would still allow unions, corporations
and interest groups--such as the Sierra
Club or the National Rifle Assn.--to spend
soft money at will during much of the year
on political ads.
He also charged that some of these ads
would be sponsored by "front groups"
that would be hard to trace back to their
original source.
The bill takes some steps to limit the
political activities of unions, corporations
and interest groups. For instance, they
would be prohibited from using their
money to pay for television or radio
advertising that targets a federal candidate
one month before a primary election and
two months before a general election.
McConnell also said that much of the
push for the bill came not from the public
but from major newspapers.
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"Today is not a moment of great courage
for the legislative branch," McConnell
said. "We have allowed a few powerful
editorial pages to prod us into infringing
the 1st Amendment rights of everyone but
them."
Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Texas), another
fervent opponent, waved a pocket copy of
the Constitution as he declared: "This bill
is a movement back to the smoke-filled
room. This concentrates power in fewer
and fewer and fewer hands. This is
profoundly anti-democratic."
Proponents countered that Congress was
rescuing public officials from a never-
ending stream of questions about how big
donors seek access and favors in
Washington. Their latest example: the
now-bankrupt Enron Corp.
The energy company and its executives
gave $3.5 million in soft money over the
last decade.
In all, Republicans and Democrats
collected $495 million in soft money
during the 1999-2000 election cycle--more
than five times the $86 million collected in
1991-92.
And in 2001, soft money accounted for
nearly half the donations collected by the
two parties.
"It doesn't look good," said Sen. Fred
Thompson (R-Tenn.), a proponent. "The
average Joe on the street believes that
with that much money being paid by that
few people, that they're expecting
something for it."
The backers acknowledged that the bill
represented just a fraction of what many
reformers have long demanded. It
proposes no new limits on what political
campaigns can spend, no limits on what
television stations can charge for political
advertising and no public financing of
campaigns. And the bill takes several steps
to ease the limits on donations.
"No one should have any illusion that if
we pass this legislation we get the big
money out of politics," said Sen. Paul D.
Wellstone (D-Minn.), a backer of the bill.
"This legislation is the first step, not the
last."
A basic compromise lies at the heart of
the bill: While taking soft money
donations away from the national parties,
effective after this year's congressional
elections, it would raise the limits on the
contributions known as hard money.
Since 1974, hard money contributions
from individual donors have been limited
to $1,000 per candidate per election and a
total of $50,000 over two years.
The bill would raise those limits to $2,000
and $95,000, respectively, and allow those
amounts to increase over time with
inflation.
As a result, while soft money to national
parties would be banned, a politically
active married couple could still give
$190,000 in an election cycle to parties
and candidates.
Many analysts say provisions of the bill
that affect soft and hard money appear
likely to withstand legal challenges
because the Supreme Court has repeatedly
upheld the constitutionality of campaign
contribution limits. Also, direct
contributions to federal candidates by
corporations and unions have long been
illegal.
More vulnerable are the provisions
imposing the regulations on political
advertising by corporations, labor unions
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and interest groups. The bill's proponents
say these "issue ads" amount to another
soft money loophole that should be
regulated.
But many of the affected groups say they
are simply exercising free speech
protected under the Constitution. The
issue-ad restrictions in the bill have been
roundly criticized by groups spanning the
ideological spectrum, from the American
Civil Liberties Union to the American
Conservative Union. A letter conservative
activists sent to Bush on Wednesday
urged the president to "do everyone a
favor by vetoing" the bill.
Others hailed the congressional action.
"Americans have won an historic victory
to help bring our government back to the
people," said Scott Harshbarger, president
of Common Cause, a group that has long
backed the campaign finance legislation.
The House approved the bill, 240 to 189,
on Feb. 14. It passed with support from a
solid bloc of Democrats and a maverick
group of Republicans. In Wednesday's
Senate vote, 11 Republican senators
joined 48 Democrats and one
independent to approve the bill. Only two
Democrats opposed the bill: Sens. John B.
Breaux of Louisiana and Ben Nelson of
Nebraska.
Earlier Wednesday, in a critical vote to
force final action, the bill's proponents
logged an even bigger victory margin. By
68 to 32, the Senate swatted down any
lingering threat of a filibuster.
What the Bill Does
The main elements of the campaign
finance bill passed by Congress on
Wednesday
Soft Money
The bill prohibits national political parties
from raising or spending soft money,
which refers to unlimited political
contributions from unions, corporations
or individuals. It also bans state and local
parties from spending soft money on
federal elections, with one exception:
allowing parties to collect up to $10,000
per donor annually in states that allow soft
money. That money could be used only
for voter registration and turnout efforts.
Hard Money
The measure doubles to $2,000 per
election what individuals can give to
candidates for president and Congress. It
also increases how much an individual can
donate to parties and candidates from
$50,000 to $95,000 every two years. These
limits would be indexed for inflation. The
bill also would ease contribution limits
even further under certain circumstances
for federal candidates who face wealthy,
self- financed opponents.
Advertisements
The bill bars special-interest groups from
using their general funds to pay for
television or radio advertising that targets
a federal candidate one month before a
primary election and two months before a
general election.
Court Review
The bill would allow some of its
provisions to remain in effect even if
others are struck down by the courts.
Effective Date
Nov. 6, 2002, for most of the bill. The
hard-money limits would take effect Jan.
1, 2003.
Copyright © 2002 Los Angeles Times
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Starr Will Help Fight Finance Reform;
Politics: The Former Independent Counsel Will Help Lead a Senator's Suit Against
the Expected Law. The Move Signals the Next Phase in a Long Battle
Los Angeles Times
March 22, 2002
Nick Anderson
Kenneth W. Starr, whose investigation of
President Clinton led to his impeachment,
will help manage the legal team named
Thursday to challenge the campaign
finance bill that President Bush has
pledged to sign into law.
Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who has
said he will be the lead plaintiff in a
lawsuit against the measure, also
announced that several other prominent
lawyers have signed up for the fight.
Joining Starr as lead co-counsel will be
Floyd Abrams, who as an expert on the
1st Amendment has represented many
media companies before the Supreme
Court, including the New York Times in
the 1971 Pentagon Papers case. Another
top lawyer signing on with McConnell was
Kathleen M. Sullivan, dean of the
Stanford University Law School. All are
offering their services pro bono,
McConnell said.
His unveiling of the legal team, even
before the campaign finance measure has
become law, signals the next phase in a
long-running battle over whether limiting
political contributions and expenditures
amounts to limiting political speech.
The bill, which cleared Congress on
Wednesday, would abolish the unlimited
donations to national political parties
known as soft money. It also would
restrict political advertisements funded by
umions, corporations and interest groups,
and take several other steps to overhaul
the fund-raising system for the first time
in nearly 30 years.
Other Challenges to Bill Expected
Proponents say the reforms would help
restore public confidence in a government
tarred by association with mega-
contributors. But foes such as McConnell
say the bill makes a mockery of the
Constitution's guarantees of free speech
and equal protection.
McConnell's lawsuit will probably not be
the only challenge to the coming law. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce has said it
will sue to block the bill. Labor groups are
weighing their options. The American
Civil Liberties Union announced
Thursday that it would be "compelled to
go to court to defend the 1st
Amendment."
Ironically, Starr could face off with a
strong supporter of his case against
Clinton, Theodore B. Olson, in expected
arguments over the bill before the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Olson left his private law practice to join
the Bush administration as U.S. solicitor,
the executive branch's main representative
before the Supreme Court.
Backers of the campaign finance bill said
they will be paying close attention to how
Olson handles the case, in part because
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Bush himself has voiced ambivalence
about the measure. The president declared
it "flawed" and said parts of it raise
constitutional questions, even as he
announced he would sign it.
The bill's best-known sponsor, Sen. John
McCain (R-Ariz.), said he trusts Olson
would do his job. "That's his
constitutional responsibility," he said.
Others said Seth Waxman, a solicitor
general during the Clinton administration,
would also be defending the bill.
Starr became nationally known as the
independent counsel heading what began
as an investigation into the involvement
of Clinton and his wife, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, into the failed 'Whitewater land
development deal. The probe escalated,
eventually leading to Clinton's
impeachment by the House on charges
stemming from his affair with White
House intern Monica S. Lewinsky. The
Senate acquitted Clinton of the charges in
February 1999.
As the case against Clinton grew, Starr
became a hero among conservatives and
an object of scorn and ridicule to many
Clinton allies.
A former federal appellate judge and U.S.
solicitor general, Starr now is in private
law practice in Washington with the firm
Kirkland & Ellis.
Starr Criticizes Bill as 'at Times Bizarre'
At a news conference with McConnell on
Thursday, Starr said the campaign finance
bill raises "grave" constitutional questions.
These questions "have tended to be
dismissed in the popular media, but it is
now time for the courts to speak
authoritatively," he said.
He criticized the bill as a "90-page-plus"
compendium of "complicated and at times
bizarre regulations."
Starr served as a clerk to Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger when the high court
issued a landmark opinion on campaign
finance in 1976 that struck down limits on
campaign spending but upheld limits on
contributions.
McConnell and his attorneys said the bill's
most vulnerable provision was a ban on
certain forms of broadcast advertising by
unions, corporations and interest groups
one month before a primary election or
two months before a general election.
But they argued that several other sections
of the bill are open to challenge, including
its centerpiece, the ban on soft money
contributions.
Abrams derided the "speech-destructive,
speech-suppressive tone of the whole"
bill.
"From start to finish, the new law seems
rooted in the notion that speech about
elections is so dangerous that it must be
rationed or quarantined," he said. "No
election law reform--none--is worth
violating the 1st Amendment."
Proponents maintain that the bill will
withstand constitutional scrutiny. But as a
safety valve, they wrote a "severability'
clause into the bill. That provision allows
the courts to strike down a portion of the
law but leave others intact.
The case would be filed in federal District
Court in Washington, and the legislation
calls for appeals to be expedited to the
Supreme Court. That means, assuming a
rapid trial in the lower court, the high
court could hear the case as early as its
next term, which begins in October.
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Free Speech and Campaign Reforn Don't Conflict
The New York Times
July 10, 2002
Seth P. Waxman
There has long been a national consensus,
the origins of which stretch back to
Theodore Roosevelt, that corporate and
union money and large individual
contributions should have no place in our
federal election system. Bans on corporate
and union election spending and large
individual campaign contributions have
consistently been upheld by the Supreme
Court as constitutional under the First
Amendment.
Over the years, the national political
parties, as well as corporations, labor
unions, and the interest groups they
finance, have circumvented the spirit, if
not the letter, of the campaign finance
laws. The new Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act, known as McCain-
Feingold, seeks to restore integrity to this
system. The law closes the infamous soft-
money loophole that federal officials and
candidates have used to raise huge
unregulated contributions, ostensibly for
general party-building activities, from
corporations, unions and individuals that
often have important matters pending
before the federal government. Those
soft-money contributions have in fact
usually been spent by the parties in
support of candidates.
In banning soft money in federal
elections, McCain-Feingold is fully
consistent with Supreme Court rulings
that affirm Congress's authority to
regulate political contributions where they
create an appearance of corruption that
undermines the vitality of our democracy.
After Enron and the Lincoln Bedroom,
does anyone doubt that enormous
political contributions provide donors
with disproportionate access to elected
federal officials?
The new law also attacks the corrosive
development of sham issue ads --
television ads that are clearly meant to
influence federal elections, yet are paid for
with money that does not comply with
federal fundraising restrictions. For
example, corporations and unions pay for
millions of dollars' worth of these ads,
though the law prohibits them from using
their funds to influence federal elections.
Likewise, political parties pay for ads that
pretend not to support or attack
candidates, but do just that, with money
that is not raised in compliance with
federal campaign law.
Opponents of reform argue that treating
sham issue ads for what they really are --
campaign ads --bans speech. It does no
such thing. Such treatment simply requires
that these campaign ads be paid for with
legal campaign money.
In the case of corporations, unions, and
the interest groups they finance, the law
applies only to a narrow range of ads --
those that are broadcast shortly before
elections and are aimed at voters relevant
to a specifically mentioned candidate. And
even within that narrow range the law
allows these entities to run any ad, at any
time, in any medium -- provided they use
money raised legally from individuals
through political action committees.
Likewise, political parties can run ads that
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say anything, at any time, in any medium -
so long as the money they use is raised
from sources, and within the limits,
allowed by federal law.
Opponents also say the new law violates
the First Amendment because it regulates
advertising regarding "issues," not
candidates. That denies reality.
When the Supreme Court in 1976
considered Congress's last effort to
reform campaign finance legislation, the
court distinguished between campaign
ads, which may be regulated, and issue
discussion, which generally may not.
Seeking to draw a line between the two in
the context of a vague statute, the court
interpreted the 1974 law to regulate only
those interest-group ads that use words
such as "vote for" or "vote against."
But experience has shown that this "magic
words" test simply does not work. Here is
a real-life example of the kind of "issue"
ad that opponents of McCain-Feingold
wish to exempt from any campaign
regulation:
"Senate candidate Winston Bryant's
budget as attorney general increased 71
percent. Bryant has taken taxpayer-funded
junkets to the Virgin Islands, Alaska and
Arizona. And spent about $100,0000 on
new furniture. . . . Winston Bryant:
government waste, political junkets, soft
on cnme.
Opponents say this is an issue ad, not a
campaign ad, because it never uses words
like "vote against Bryant."
Today, even most ads run by candidates
themselves don't use the magic words
identified by the Supreme Court in 1976.
It has become absurdly easy for political
parties, corporate spenders and interest
groups to skirt the law simply by avoiding
those words in their candidate-advocacy
messages. Technical compliance with the
law combined with obvious evasion of its
spirit has turned campaign finance into a
cynical game. That is why Congress
needed to act -- to draw a line that actually
works.
The First Amendment does not condemn
us to a debased political process awash in
unlimited, disguised donations. We need
not confront daily the demoralizing show
of elected officials chasing immense
contributions that everyone knows buy
preferential access and influence. We can
have both free speech and a government
of which our citizens are proud. The court
has marked the way to do that, and
Congress has followed its path.
Seth P. Waxman served as solicitor
general during the Clinton administration
and represents the sponsors of the new
campaign finance reform law in litigation
challenging its constitutionality.
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Paying Up Is Speaking Up
The New York Times
October 24, 1999
Kathleen M. Sullivan
Those who claim that our political system
is awash in money, corruption and
influence peddling were predictably upset
that the Senate again defeated the
campaign finance restriction proposed by
Senators Russell Feingold and John
McCain. The Senate's failure to ban "soft
money' -- large contributions to political
parties that are made to avoid tight
restrictions on donations to candidates --
drew laments from editorial pages to
corporate boardrooms, where some
business executives now plead, "Stop us
before we spend again."
The advocates of new, improved
campaign finance reform are well-
intentioned but misguided. Of course
none of us wishes to live in a plutocracy,
where wealth alone determines political
clout. But as Senator Mitch McConnell
noted in a heated exchange with Senator
McCain, American politics today is far
from "corrupt" in the traditional sense.
And the most troubling features of
political fund-raising today are the
unintended consequences of earlier efforts
at campaign finance reform. Begin with
the allegations of "corruption."
Contributions to candidates and parties
today do not line anybody's pockets, as
they did in the heyday of machines like
Tammany Hall. Vigilant media and law
enforcement now nip improper personal
enrichment in the bud, as politicians
involved in the savings and loan scandals
found out to their detriment.
Political money today instead goes directly
into political advertising, a quintessential
form of political speech. Our large
electoral districts and weak political parties
force candidates to communicate directly
with large groups of voters. This depends
on the use of the privately owned mass
media. Thus getting the candidate's
message out is expensive. I
Reformers sometimes decry today's
political advertising as repetitious and
reductive. But it is not clear what golden
age of high-minded debate they hark back
to; the antecedents of the spot ad are,
after all, the bumper sticker and slogans
like "Tippecanoe and Tyler, Too."
Nor is there any doubt that restrictions on
political money amount to restnictions on
political speech. Reformers sometimes say
they merely seek to limit money, not
speech. But a law, say, barring newspapers
from accepting paid political
advertisements or limiting the prices of
political books would also limit only the
exchange of money. Yet no one would
question that it would inhibit political
speech -- as do restrictions on campaign
finance.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court only
half recognized this point when, in 1976,
it struck down limits on political
expenditures while upholding limits on
political gifts. Expenditures, the Court
reasoned, may not be limited in order to
level the playing field, but political
contributions may be limited to prevent
the reality or appearance that big
contributors will have disproportionate
influence. So we still have in place the
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1974 law limiting individual contributions
to a Federal candidate to $1,000 per
election -- the equivalent of about $383 in
1999 dollars -- and, perversely, candidates
must spend ever more time chasing an
ever larger number of donors.
The Court's noble but flawed attempt at
compromise leaves us in the worst of all
possible worlds: government may limit the
supply of political money but not the
demand. This is a situation that in a
commercial setting would produce a black
or gray market, and politics is no different.
Instead of money flowing directly to
candidates, it flows to parties as soft
money, or to independent advocacy
organizations for issue ads that often
imply support for or opposition to
specific candidates.
Political spending and speech thus have
been shifted away from the candidates,
who are accountable to the voters, to
organizations that are much harder for the
voters to monitor and discipline -- a result
that turns democracy on its head.
Reform proposals such as McCain-
Feingold proceed on the assumption that
the answer is to keep on shutting down
"loopholes" in the system. But in a system
of private ownership and free expression,
we can never shut all the loopholes down.
If the wealthy cannot bankroll campaigns,
they can buy newspapers or set up
lobbying organizations that will draft
legislation rather than campaign ads.
When the cure has been worse than the
disease, the solution is not more doses of
the same medicine.
Does this mean we should eliminate all
campaign finance regulation? Certainly
not. Even if we give up on contribution
limits, we should retain and enhance
mandatory disclosure and public subsidies
-- two kinds of government intervention
that are consistent with both democracy
and the Constitution.
Mandatory disclosure of the amounts and
sources of political contributions enables
the voters themselves, aided by the press,
to follow the money and hold their
representatives accountable if they smell
the foul aroma of undue influence. Such
disclosure is an extraordinarily powerful
and accessible tool in the age of the
Internet.
And more widespread public subsidies,
like those now given in presidential and
some state races, could, if given early in
campaigns, help political challengers reach
the critical threshold amounts they need
to get their messages out.
In ongoing debates about campaign
finance reform, it is worth remembering
that free speech principles bar the creation
of ceilings on political money, but they do
not bar the raising of floors.
Kathleen M. Sullivan is a professor of
constitutional law and dean at Stanford
Law School.
Copyright D 1999 The New York Times
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McCain-Feingold: No Cause for Alarm
The Washington Post
April 24, 2001
Norman Ornstein
During the past few weeks, The Post has
published a series of op-ed columns
assailing McCain-Feingold campaign
finance reform, ranging from vitriolic (the
reform is "insane," said Michael Kelly) to
dismissive (Robert Samuelson analogized
reform to Prohibition in its naivete and
likely effect). These pieces and others
have caricatured reformers as zealots
aiming to destroy or distort the First
Amendment, trying to take all money out
of politics and having pie-in-the-sky
notions of the ability of laws to alter
political behavior.
As one of the architects of core parts of
the pending reform, I find the attacks
simplistic, overdrawn and aimed largely at
straw men. To take the Prohibition
analogy, there are those who believe that
alcohol is evil and should be prohibited.
Then there are those who helped to pass
laws that prohibit sales of alcohol to those
under 21, punish bars or liquor stores that
sell to teenagers and advocate stiff
penalties for drunk driving. The latter
group of people do not for a second
believe that such efforts will stop all or
most teenagers from drinking or eliminate
drunk drivers. But the laws do put broad
boundaries around behavior that is
destructive to society and almost certainly
reduce the incidence of underage drinking
and drunk driving. It is easy to caricature
reformers who believe that politics and
money are each evil. Most such purists
actually oppose McCain-Feingold because
it increases hard money limits. But the
moderate reform advocates who four
years ago put together the ideas that
undergird the current McCain-Feingold
did not believe that reform would be an
eternal panacea, or that the basic problem
was too much money in politics. Instead,
we saw a system that had careened out of
control, partly because of the cumulative
consequences of earlier reform efforts and
the 20 years that followed them.
Soft money, a 1978 bureaucratic creation
of the Federal Election Commission to
promote grass-roots party-building, had
morphed into a giant slush fund for
parties to run campaign ads. Politicians
had developed sophisticated ways to raise
soft money, including the equivalent of a
giant protection racket to squeeze more
and more from wealthy donors who were
denied the immunity of a limit on what
they could give. Outside groups had
found a loophole that enabled them to
operate outside the campaign rules,
running hundreds of millions of dollars of
clear campaign ads financed in unlimited
amounts from any source without any
disclosure. The loophole? The ads merely
avoided using "magic" words like "vote
for," "elect" or "defeat" that the Supreme
Court had suggested define express
advocacy.
Our incremental, reasonable and
constitutional ideas included ending
federal soft money -- while simultaneously
increasing the existing limits on hard
money contributions to candidates and
parties. As for the new campaign ads, if
those magic words defined campaign
communications in the 1970s, they clearly
did not in the 1990s or now. We know
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from systematic research of the last
campaign, for example, that only 4
percent of candidate ads -- the sine qua
non of express advocacy -- used those
"magic words." We target a narrow
category of broadcast ads aimed at the
district or state of a candidate in the 60
days before a general election or 30 days
before a primary -- when the context is far
different, and the impact on campaigns
much greater.
Contrary to the assertions of Samuelson,
Kelly and others, these messages would
not be banned. Rather, no corporate or
union treasury monies could be used to
finance them -- in keeping with legal and
judicial precedents respectively 94 and 44
years old -- and they would require
disclosure of large individual
contributions to them. Corporations and
unions could still run their ads; they would
just have to fund them, as they do today's
direct campaign ads, through their
political action committees, or PACs.
Is this unconstitutional? Every former
executive and legal director of the
American Civil Liberties Union says that it
fits comfortably within the reasoning
behind the 1976 Buckley and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. As Samuelson
says, this would not stop groups from
running print ads or major campaigns
outside the 60-day window. But print ads
and ads run long before an election have
much less impact. Much of the money
now used for soft money ads and sham
issue ads will find its way back into the
system through subterranean roots -- but
much will not. Dozens of corporate
CEOs say they will be delighted to stop
contributing soft money, which they have
viewed as access insurance or as a payoff
to keep lawmakers from taking retributive
action.
Some of our ideas did not make it into
McCain-Feingold. We would have
preferred larger increases in individual
contribution limits; a tax credit for small
donors; a sensible free TV time provision.
But the core of reasonable, measured,
pragmatic and incremental reform is there.
Doing as Samuelson would advocate --
eliminating campaign finance laws and
allowing the free market to operate -- is
the equivalent of saying that since we can't
stop teenage drinking or drunk driving, we
might as well eliminate the laws
prohibiting sales to minors and punishing
drunk drivers, and let the system work it
all out. McCain-Feingold is no panacea.
But it is not Prohibition, it is not insane,
and it is not unconstitutional.
The writer is a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute.
Copyright © 2001 The Washington Post
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McCain-Feingold's Fatal Flaws
The Washington Post
April 5, 2001
Michael Kelly
The good news about the McCain-
Feingold campaign finance reform bill,
which passed the Senate this week by a
vote of 59 to 41, is that it is at its heart
such an insane measure that it will never
be the law of the land. The courts will gut
McCain-Feingold from stem to stem, and
hurrah for that.
The emotional appeal of McCain-Feingold
is its ban of "soft money," the unregulated
millions that pour into federal campaigns
in an increasingly blatant, and entirely
successful, effort to weasel around federal
election laws governing direct
contributions to candidates. This appeal is
understandable. It was clear that the
Clinton-Gore White House, in which
access to the president and special
consideration on issues of government
policy were openly sold for soft money,
had to represent a bottom; there had to be
some sort of response to such an open
display of corruption. McCain-Feingold is
the response, and the temptation is to
gaze upon it with a lover's eyes. This,
though, is not how the Supreme Court
will regard the reeking mess that the
Senate cleared off its desk this week. The
court will -- any court would -- view
McCain-Feingold for what it is: an
insupportable, blatantly unconstitutional
assault on the rights to speak and
associate freely. The assault comes in the
areas of the bill that have received less
attention than the media-beloved soft-
money ban.
Media descriptions of the bill tend to
describe its speech-restricting provisions
in a shorthand: under an amendment
offered by Sen. Paul Wellstone, the bill
would prohibit nonprofit groups, for-
profit corporations, labor unions and
trade associations from sponsoring
broadcast advertisements that name and
"promote candidates" within 30 days of a
primary election or 60 days of a general
election. In fact, the bill is much more
sweeping in its restnctions.
If the courts find the above measure to be
unconstitutional (which they will),
McCain-Feingold will move to protect its
speech restrictions under a contingency
amendment offered by Sen. Arlen Specter.
The Specter amendment is actually much
worse than the Wellstone amendment. It
forbids the covered groups from
sponsoring -- at any time -- any broadcast
advertisement that '"promotes,"
"supports," "attacks" or "opposes" any
"candidate," and that is "suggestive of no
plausible meaning other than an
exhortation to vote for or against a
specific candidate." This appears to
prohibit, say, a labor union, from paying
for an ad that pointed out that
Congressman X had voted against the
increase in the minimum wage. Indeed, it
appears to prohibit saying almost
anything.
Then there is the great man's own
contribution, the McCain amendment.
This late entry rewrote Section 214 of the
bill, which sought to curtail
"coordination" between a candidate and
independent groups sponsoring ads. The
amendment rejects current law, which
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defines "coordination" as involving
"collaboration or agreement," and instead
defines it much more broadly as "any
general understanding." Any group that
was deemed to have "coordinated" under
this impossibly broad definition would be
barred from "any disbursement made ...
in connection with a candidate's election,
regardless of whether the disbursement is
for a communication that contains express
advocacy."
All of this runs blatantly against the
numerous and explicit rulings of the
Supreme Court in this area. In the 1976
Buckley v. Valeo case, the court said: "So
long as persons and groups eschew
expenditures that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate, they are free to spend
as much as they want to promote the
candidate and his views." In this ruling
and in the 1986 FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, the court clearly defined
"express advocacy" in the narrowest
terms: "containing express words of
advocacy of election or defeat, such as
'vote for,' 'elect' ... "
The court has also ruled against the idea
that a third party, such as the Federal
Election Commission, should be
empowered to determine whether a
message is "understood" to be a political
one.
There is more in McCain-Feingold that
the courts will find pernicious. In the
pungent analysis of James Bopp Jr.,
general counsel for the James Madison
Center for Free Speech, "This bill shakes a
fist at the First Amendment; if passed it is
destined for a court-ordered funeral."
Most of the senators who voted for it
probably know this is true; that's one
reason so many voted for it.
What's troubling is not that this attack on
speech will stand; it is that it has been so
widely and unthinkingly applauded as a
good thing. This is bizarre. Do good-
government liberals really want a country
where labor unions and environmental
groups and the NAACP are stifled? Do
they really want a country where the laws
protect the politicians from those who
would tell embarrassing truths about
them?
[Michael Kelly is a columnist for the
Washington Post]
Copyright * 2001 The Washington Post
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Justices Back Outlay Limits on Campaigns;
Court: Decision Upholds Laws of Post-Watergate Spending Reforns of '70s.
Idea of Free-speech Right to Raise Funds Is Rejected.
Los Angeles Times
June 26, 2001
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court came down Monday
squarely on the side of the reformers who
want to limit the influence of money in
politics, ruling that Congress can restrict
how much the political parties spend to
fund their candidates.
The 5-4 decision upheld party spending
limits that have been part of federal law
since the post-Watergate reforms of the
1970s. Perhaps more important, however,
the justices rejected the idea that the
parties have a special free-speech right
when it comes to raising and spending
money.
Monday's ruling gives lawmakers clear
authority to regulate political spending
and marks a decided shift in tone from
five years ago. It may well reflect the
fund-raising scandals and excesses that
have beset Washington since 1996.
Justice David H. Souter, speaking for the
court, cast aside an idealistic view of
political parties as having a special role in
U.S. politics, instead focusing on "how the
power of money actually works in the
political structure."
Parties today are not just debating
societies, he said. They often are
"matchmakers" that bring together
candidates and rich donors, and they can
be "used as a funnel" to channel money
from a wealthy contributor to a grateful
candidate, he added.
Current federal law says that individuals
can give $2,000 per election cycle to a
candidate and $20,000 to a party. If the
parties have a free-speech right to spend
unlimited amounts to fund their
candidates, far more money could be
pumped into campaigns, he said.
"What would become of contribution
limits if parties could use unlimited
coordinated spending to funnel
contributions to those serious contenders
who are favored by the donors?" Souter
asked.
He answered the question by saying that
Congress can restrict spending by the
parties.
"They see the problem of big money in
the political system," said Don Simon,
general counsel for the citizens' group
Common Cause, which supports reform.
"They have seen the explosive growth of
soft money and they once again recognize
the real danger of big money corrupting
the system."
The legal status of the parties and the
constitutionality of spending limits are at
the center of the debate in Congress over
efforts to ban so-called "soft money"
contributions.
Thanks to a loophole in federal election
law, since 1996 the Republican and
Democratic parties have taken in huge
contributions from corporations, unions
186
and individual donors. They are supposed
to use the money to build their parties,
not to fund candidates.
But in fact the parties spend hundreds of
millions of dollars of soft money on so-
called "issue ads" and other activities that
differ little from true campaign ads that
promote or attack specific candidates.
Reformers say the soft-money loophole
makes a mockery of campaign finance
laws, and in April, the Senate passed the
McCain-Feingold bill to ban these
unregulated contributions to the parties.
The House is expected to take up the
campaign finance bill soon, but its
prospects are far from certain. It also is
not clear whether President Bush would
sign campaign finance reform legislation.
Opponents of the federal spending limits,
led by Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and
House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-
Texas), say these restrictions on the
parties violate their 1st Amendment
rights.
Taken together with last year's decision,
Monday's ruling shifts the court strongly
and surprisingly in the direction of
funding restrictions and away from the
wide-open free-speech view that gained
popularity several years ago.
Legal critics, liberal and conservative alike,
had argued that the campaign funding
laws had failed. They did not stem the
flow of money into politics but merely
redirected its flow, they said. And the 1st
Amendment's protection of free speech
should be especially sweeping in the area
of campaigns and political parties, they
added.
Five years ago, the justices sounded these
notes in a ruling that struck down the
federal limits on "independent
expenditures" by political parties. This
refers to money spent to promote a
party's agenda or a candidate's campaign,
but that is not directly coordinated with a
candidate.
On a 7-2 vote in the case of FEC vs. the
Colorado Republicans, the justices said
this limit violated the 1st Amendment.
Four members of the majority--Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas--went further, saying all
such spending restrictions were
unconstitutional. In a separate opinion,
Thomas said the 1976 ruling in Buckley
vs. Valeo upholding contribution limits
should be overruled.
Three others, Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer and Souter,
joined a ruling that endorsed the free-
speech rights but stopped short of
throwing out the spending limits for
money that was coordinated directly with
a candidate.
That issue was sent back to a trial judge in
Denver, where the Colorado case
originated. Last year, the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Denver struck down the party
limits on free-speech grounds and sent the
case back to the high court.
But since rendering their 1996 decision
that struck down federal limits on
"independent expenditures," the justices
have seen and read much about fund-
raising scandals and excesses. The
scandals involved the 1996 Bill Clinton-Al
Gore reelection campaign and the
Democratic National Committee, as well
as the huge wave of money that fueled the
Republican and Democratic campaigns
last year.
In something of a surprise, Souter,
O'Connor and Breyer shifted sides in the
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Colorado case and formed the five-
member majority Monday to uphold the
party spending limits.
Although Monday's ruling "didn't deal
with soft money," Simon said, "it bodes
very well for how the court will see the
McCain-Feingold bill."
In the 2000 presidential election cycle, the
Democrats raised $270 million in soft
money and the Republicans collected $447
million, according to data collected by the
Federal Election Commission.
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chief
sponsor of the bill, agreed that the
decision gives his reform effort an
important boost. "Our opponents will
have to find some excuse not to enact
laws to restore Americans' confidence in
our political system."
McConnell, the leading advocate of the
free-speech view, said he preferred the
1996 ruling over Monday's. "Those of us
who side with freedom for American
political parties still rejoice" in the earlier
ruling that allowed them to spend freely
for independent promotions.
Thomas spoke for the dissenters Monday,
again calling for overruling all limits on
political contributions and spending.
"I remain baffled that this court has
extended the most generous 1st
Amendment safeguards" to matters such
as pornographic books, but has refused to
shield political parties and their
campaigns, he said. Rehnquist, Scalia and
Kennedy joined in the dissent.
* * *
Copyright © 2001 Los Angeles Times
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Big Changes Loom, Some Unknowable; Bill to Transform Fundraising Tactics
The Washington Post
February 15, 2002
Thomas B. Edsall
Campaign finance reform legislation, if
signed into law, would profoundly alter
the rules of American politics by, among
other things, de-emphasizing the role of
mega-donors, boosting the parties' need
for small and mid-range contributors and
making it even more difficult for
challengers to oust congressional
incumbents.
Analysts and insiders say the measure also
may shift power away from corporations
willing to make huge "soft money"
donations -- the tobacco and
pharmaceutical industries, for example.
Groups likely to benefit, meanwhile, could
include large law firms with many
members able and perhaps willing to give
$ 1,000 to $ 25,000 annually to candidates
and parties.
While strategists of all stripes scrambled
yesterday to divine the likely impact of the
House-passed bill, the history of such
legislation suggests they can't possibly
anticipate all its ramifications. "We are
going to be in the land of unintended
consequences," said Don McGahn,
general counsel to the National
Republican Congressional Committee.
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a leading
advocate of overhauling the finance rules,
warned that "the day this bill is passed,
smart guys down on K Street [a lobbyists'
enclave] -- the ones who are making
millions under the present system -- will
be figuring out loopholes to try to get
around it. And they will succeed to some
degree."
If the new regulations are enacted and
survive court challenges, Republicans and
Democrats alike will lose a vehicle that
has yielded hundreds of millions of dollars
in recent years: unregulated "soft money."
Such funds are used for general party-
building purposes as well as for hard-
hitting ads that stop just short of
advocating a candidate's election or defeat.
In turn, the legislation would elevate the
importance of a category of donors who
give "hard money," or regulated cash that
can be used for virtually any legal purpose.
These are relatively affluent people who
traditionally have not given huge soft-
money sums but are prepared to give
several thousand dollars a year --
conceivably as much as the $ 95,000 limit
every two years.
These people could donate as much as $
4,000 annually to individual candidates,
and as much as $ 25,000 to the parties.
This is the one constituency whose
contributions can increase under the
proposed law, virtually doubling the
current limits.
That's why the bill seems likely to boost
the clout of any organization with many
reasonably affluent and politically active
members. This could help either party if it
mobilizes skillfully. Members of major
environmental organizations might be
persuaded to give generously to
Democrats, for example, while
Republicans could tap business trade
groups even more aggressively than in the
past.
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If the bill becomes law, "we would be
asked to raise more in hard money," said
Robert A. Rusbuldt, executive vice
president of the Independent Insurance
Agents of America, a traditional GOP
supporter. "The corporate lobbyists will
not have the ability to raise soft money.
There is no doubt, some of us [association
executives] figure, that grass-roots
organizations that have always raised hard
dollars will be called on" to generate even
higher sums to compensate the loss of
soft money.
Pre'sident Bush's political operation may
provide a model for such efforts. Starting
with his presidential bid in 1999, Bush
cultivated more than 200 "pioneers" --
people who raised more than $ 100,000
each in $ 1,000 hard-money contributions
from friends and associates. This group
may give Bush's 2004 reelection campaign
a head start in the new world of campaign
finance regulations.
Democratic fundraiser David Jones said
the pressure to shift to high-dollar, hard-
money fundraising will result in "a huge
increase in the amount of bundling that
goes on, which will make it much more
difficult to identify who is actually raising
the money."
A "bundling" fundraiser collects many
checks made out to a candidate or party,
and, by turning them in, gets credit as a
major supporter. The bundler's role often
is not found in public records.
Democrats, meanwhile, acknowledge they
must build larger and better lists of direct-
mail donors, a sometimes costly but
effective technique in which they have
lagged behind the GOP. Democrats may
be able to use direct mail to exploit their
growing strength among upscale white
professionals, who generally embrace the
party's support of abortion rights,
environmental protection and opposition
to the Christian right. Perhaps,
Democratic strategists hope, they can be
persuaded to give money, too.
Terence R McAuliffe, chairman of the
Democratic National Committee, said that
in 2001, the DNC boosted direct-mail
revenue to $ 25 million -- that compared
with $ 14 million in 1997, the previous
post-presidential election year. He said he
hopes to raise $ 100 million in 2004.
McAuliffe plans to use the nine-month
"window" before the soft-money ban
would take effect to raise and spend
roughly $ 30 million in soft money for a
new, high-tech headquarters, fully
equipped with computerized lists, a
dedicated cable line and other electronic
mechanisms to reach donor bases that
would remain legal.
The Democrats' decision to delay the
effective date until Nov. 6, the day after
the election, will, according to National
Republican Congressional Committee
Chairman Rep. Thomas M. Davis III (R-
Va.), result in a short-term fundraising
"binge." The Democrats "won't be
drinking alone," he said. "We'll take
whatever comes -- hard money, soft
money, building money, Indian gaming
money.
The party committees likely to have the
toughest time adjusting to the new rules
are the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee and the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee, each
highly dependent on soft money. The
DCCC reported that in 2001, it raised $
33.8 million, $ 16.4 million in hard money
and $ 17.4 million in soft money. The
DSCC raised $ 37 million, of which $ 22.8
million was soft money.
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Strong Reaction to Soft Money Changes in Wording Irk Campaign Bill Sponsors
The Boston Globe
June 22, 2002
Bret Ladine
Proponents of campaign finance reform
believed they had scored a major victory
in April when Congress passed landmark
legislation that banned the use of "soft
money" by national parties.
But the Federal Election Commission, the
agency responsible for implementing and
enforcing the new law, this week crafted
regulations that contain several
exemptions for the use of soft money
donations large, unlimited contributions
from business, unions, and wealthy
individuals to political parties.
The FEC's rules limit the impact of the
law and have angered its sponsors, who
say that the agency's appointed
commissioners are subverting the will of
Congress by creating "loopholes" that
would enable soft money to be used
indirectly to finance election campaigns
for federal offices.
"Congress spent seven years debating
complex and difficult policy issues before
reaching the judgments contained in the
bill," said the four sponsors, Senators
John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and
Russell Feingold, Democrat of Wisconsin,
and Representatives Christopher Shays,
Republican of Connecticut, and Martin
Meehan, Democrat of Lowell, in a joint
statement. "The FEC's job is to
implement those judgments, not revisit
them to enforce the law, not undermine
it." The new FEC rules still ban national
parties from raising or spending soft
money. Regulations also prohibit the use
of soft money to fund "issue ads"
television spots
partisan and
candidates.
that are
directed
often
at
heavily
specific
The FEC, however, carved out an
exemption for federal candidates and
party leaders that would allow them to
raise soft money for state parties. The
commission, composed of three
Democrats and three Republicans, also
allowed for soft money financing of
Internet communications.
Changes in the rules, often on 4-2 or 5-1
votes, were made during two days of
meetings this week. The commission said
Wednesday that federal candidates could
violate the ban on raising soft money only
by explicitly soliciting such contributions
for themselves. It went further on
Thursday when it said that federal
candidates can make appeals for soft
money donations at fund-raisers for local
and state parties.
The FEC will formally vote on the final
language of those rules at a meeting today.
"These are subtle but significant
amendments," said Meehan, who intended
the legislation to ban federal candidates
from making any appeals for soft money.
"They're taking out their regulatory pens
and rewriting the law we fought so hard to
enact."
The ties between national and state parties
are deep and extensive. Democratic and
Republican state party committees raised
nearly $600 million during the 2000
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elections. In a joint study to be released
this week, three public interest groups
the Center for Public Integrity, the Center
for Responsive Politics, and the National
Institute on Money in State Politics
found that more than 40 percent of that
total came in the form of soft money
transfers from national party groups.
FEC comissioners, however, disagree
about the intentions of the rules they
seem set to formally approve today. They
take issue with the four sponsors'
assertion that candidates would still be
able to raise money for state parties with
"a wink and a nod."
The legislation's sponsors "keep referring
to tacit understandings that they somehow
see coming out of the language we've
written," said commissioner Bradley
Smith, a Republican. "How do you
regulate a 'wink and a nod?' We properly
interpreted the act and we made
improvements to the proposed regulations
made to us beforehand."
FEC vice chairman Karl Sandstrom, a
Democrat who offered most of the
controversial amendments, is upset that
the commission's actions have been
transformed into political theater.
"Nobody wants to grapple with reasons
when they can substitute a caricature of
motivations," he said.
One attorney familiar with the recent FEC
actions said the commission had a difficult
task in writing these rules because of First
Amendment issues.
"These rules by their very definition
interfere with First Amendment speech,
which may be OK if it's toward the goal
of preventing the corruption of the
political process," said Kenneth Gross, a
campaign finance specialist at the
Skadden, Arps law firm. "But when you
regulate First Amendment speech, not
only do you have to be narrow, but you
have to be exacting because ambiguity and
lack of clarity in and of itself is
unconstitutional."
But the sponsors of the legislation
continue to openly question the FEC's
political motivations and are preparing to
take action. Meehan said he and his
colleagues will wait and look at the precise
language agreed upon. They are
considering three options: action in the
House and Senate under the
Congressional Review Act, which
provides a 60-day window for Congress to
reject final regulations issued by federal
agencies; new legislation, which would be
introduced first in the Senate by McCain;
or a lawsuit against the FEC.
"We'll analyze the situation this weekend
and hopefully make a decision next week,"
Meehan said.
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